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
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# Intelligence Report

**COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS**

**I. EVOLUTION, 1927-1965**

**(Reference Title: POLO XXXV)**

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**20 February 1969  
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**COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS****I. EVOLUTION, 1927-1965****MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS**

This is the first of two staff studies on the political security apparatus in Communist China. This first paper is a detailed, analytical chronology, tracing the shifting structure and leadership of the apparatus from its primitive origins in the 1920s to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1965

In the course of opening up the history of some of the key organs of political control in Communist China, the study provides interesting sidelights on Mao as a leader, seeking to shape the political security apparatus to suit his own changing sense of what was necessary to create and maintain a party loyal and responsive to him. Also, the findings of this study support the conclusions of other analysts that the origins of the Cultural Revolution--Mao's decision to purge the party and his preparations for the purge--may be traced as far back into time as 1962, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Great Leap.

The second of the series of two studies will concentrate on the fortunes and role of the political security apparatus during the Cultural Revolution, and on its present configuration and prospects.

( This study has been reviewed and aided by appropriate officers in the DD/P, OCI, and OER. The China Branch of the Far Eastern and Pacific Division of the Central Reference Service was especially helpful in locating and making available basic research materials. However, the study is solely the product of the Special Research Staff.)

Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

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## COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS

## I. EVOLUTION, 1927-1965

## SUMMARY

A primitive political security apparatus--responsive to the pre-Mao central leadership in Shanghai, and probably headed by Chou En-lai--was identified in the CCP in the late 1920s. With the transfer of the central leadership to Kiangsi and the emergence of a Political Security Bureau there (under Teng Fa) in 1932, Mao set to work both to become the dominant figure in the party and to create a security apparatus responsive to himself.

Mao established his domination of the party during the Long March in 1935, and late in 1937 he installed Kang Sheng, just back from Moscow, as chief of the security apparatus. Li Ko-nung stayed on as first deputy, with Lo Jui-ching at a lower level. The organs which were to become the central committee's staff office and its political research office emerged at this time.

In the early 1940s Mao conducted a "rectification" of the CCP--aimed at possible rivals--in which Kang Sheng and his security apparatus were useful, and in 1945 Mao surfaced his new hierarchy and apparatus. The party congress formalized the status of Liu Shao-chi as the second-ranking party leader, and added to the politburo Kang Sheng and Peng Chen. It placed a new party secretariat--under Mao--in charge of the party's "daily work" and in authority over the political security apparatus, which was to prove important later when Mao removed himself from the routine. The party congress also unveiled the Social Affairs Department, under Kang Sheng and Li Ko-nung, to replace the Political Security Bureau at the center of the political security apparatus.

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In the course of the CCP's successful military-and-political struggle with the Nationalists in the years 1946-1949, the party reorganized its political security apparatus. By 1948 Kang Sheng had been removed as director of the Social Affairs Department (SAD) and exiled to a provincial post--probably on the initiative of Liu Shao-chi. Kang was succeeded by his deputy Li Ko-nung.

With the proclamation of a national government in 1949, the Ministry of Public Security was established under Lo Jui-ching; this was to work as an organic whole with the procuratorates and courts. The party also authorized at this time the establishment of "discipline inspection committees" to investigate violations of law and discipline by party members.

As of 1949, the political security apparatus consisted mainly of:

(a) the secretariat, under Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen, which supervised the apparatus;

(b) the central committee staff office under Yang Shang-kun, which was the main repository of classified records (including those of party leaders), the organ responsible for the physical protection of party leaders (a section under Wang Tung-hsing), and possibly the organ responsible for assigning cadres to the political security apparatus;

(c) the Social Affairs Department under Li Ko-nung, charged with investigating the loyalty of party members, working with the political security bureaus of the Organization Department and the General Political Department and with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS);

(d) the Ministry of Public Security under Lo Jui-ching, providing a supplementary apparatus to the SAD for investigations and arrests, but concerned mainly with non-party people; and

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(e) the discipline inspection committees which assessed the obedience of party members.

The Peking regime in its first few years was occupied in large part with the establishment of totalitarian controls over China. To this end, the regime launched a massive campaign against "counter-revolutionaries" in the years 1950-52 which ruined the lives and careers of millions and resulted in at least two million deaths. When the real threat to Mao's arrangements emerged, however, it was from the party politburo and party apparatus in 1953--a challenge by Mao's "close comrade" Kao Kang and by party organization director Jao Shu-shih, who allegedly tried to replace Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai as Mao's top two lieutenants and to make the party and state responsive to themselves.

The political security apparatus apparently failed to discover the Kao-Jao conspiracy at an early stage, and thus failed its first big test. Peng Chen and Li Ko-nung were held in part responsible. Teng Hsiao-ping emerged in 1954 in the new post of secretary-general of the party, dislodging Peng as Liu Shao-chi's first lieutenant for party affairs and for supervision of the security apparatus. Kang Sheng returned triumphantly--probably at Mao's insistence--from his exile, and seemed for some time thereafter to displace Li as the foremost figure in political security work.

The party conference which surfaced the Kao-Jao case in March 1955 established a Central Control Commission, with subordinate commissions, in the party apparatus, replacing the discipline inspection committees. These commissions, to work within party committees at every level, were to exercise "strict supervision" of all party members, and could take disciplinary action against members of party committees at lower levels.

In this period of the early 1950s, the Social Affairs Department divested itself of some of its functions and part of its apparatus, and by 1955 had apparently been stripped down for the most efficient handling of its most important work--that is, the most sensitive political

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security cases, notably those involving party leaders. Although the SAD's concern with party members was divided with the control commissions, at first there was a difference in emphasis; the SAD was concerned with questions of loyalty, while the commissions concentrated on assuring obedience.

As of mid-1955, the dominant figure in the security and intelligence apparatus--under the continued supervision of Liu Shao-chi and now Teng Hsiao-ping too--was again Kang Sheng. The other key figures were: Li Ko-nung of the SAD; Lo Jui-ching, still head of the MPS; Yang Shang-kun, still director of the central committee's staff office and from 1955 a deputy secretary-general of the party; Yang Chi-ching, second-ranking in the MPS and high-ranking in the SAD; and Hsu Tzu-jung, next-ranking in the MPS and also a key figure in the SAD.

Kang Sheng began to slip again in the latter half of 1955, and by early 1956 it appeared that Liu Shao-chi--reinforced now by Teng Hsiao-ping--had again persuaded Mao to let him take Kang out of political security work. Later in 1956, the party congress named Teng to head the new secretariat. This congress placed Liu and Teng on the "first line" of party work, while Mao stepped back to the "second line"--a delegation of power which Mao was later to repent.

The congress strengthened Teng's grip on the political security apparatus. His deputies and close associates--including Yang Shang-kun, Wang Tsung-wu, and Hsu Tzu-jung--were named to key positions in the new secretariat, the Central Control Commission, and the Ministry of Public Security. However, the two top posts in the Social Affairs Department and the Ministry of Public Security--director and Minister--remained in the hands of men not close to Teng--Li Ko-nung and Lo Jui-ching.

In autumn 1957, Li Ko-nung was suddenly disabled by a stroke, leaving open the critical post of director of the SAD. Teng Hsiao-ping probably took direct control of this department--either as its director or from his post on the secretariat. By mid-1958 Teng had become the principal supervisor of the entire security and intelligence apparatus, with Peng Chen as his first lieutenant.

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At the end of 1958 the party made a partial retreat from its "leap forward" and commune programs. The failure of these programs and the dissatisfaction of some party leaders with Mao's leadership gave fresh emphasis to the main function of the political security apparatus--that of preventing an effective challenge to Mao.

An open challenge--led by Defense Minister Peng Te-huai--came in summer 1959 at the Lushan plenum. Although this challenge was not effective, the security apparatus may have failed to give warning of it. In any case, the apparatus now faced the task of discovering Mao's covert opponents.

Mao immediately reorganized the defense establishment, while keeping his good opinion of the leaders of political security work. He named the intensely loyal Lin Piao as Minister of Defense and made the security specialist Lo Jui-ching the chief-of-staff. The vacated key post of Minister of Public Security was given to Teng Hsiao-ping's longtime protege Hsieh Fu-chih. Teng now appeared to have in his own hands or in the hands of his close associates and proteges the control of every key part of the political security apparatus.

This apparatus retained, at the end of the 1950s, essentially the form it had assumed ten years earlier. However, the control commissions were gaining in stature. It was not clear whether the party meant to close out the Social Affairs Department when the commissions proved able to do their job, or meant instead to keep the SAD for the most sensitive political security cases. While a small SAD (or equivalent) probably continued, the control commissions--working with the party committees--apparently played the larger role in the intensified "anti-rightist" campaign which followed the Lushan plenum.

In early 1960, Mao's basic policies were still under attack, and it was evident by late summer--when the Russians withdrew--that Mao's opponents had been right in predicting disastrous consequences. Perhaps already looking toward another challenge, Mao and Lin Piao began to rebuild the morale and combat-effectiveness of the PLA and to construct a new political apparatus in it.

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By early 1961, the case against Mao's policies was being stated in the public press by intellectuals, and by late 1961 the opposition had apparently found new spokesmen in the party politburo. At the party's January 1962 work conference, Liu Shao-chi and others were indirectly critical of the basic policies which had been reaffirmed at Lushan, and Liu was additionally critical of the anti-rightist campaign.

There is good evidence that Liu's attitude caused Mao to think about Liu and Teng, and the party apparatus as a whole, in a new way. Because Liu and Teng controlled this apparatus, including the political security apparatus which would normally be relied on to discover the full range of Mao's opponents, Mao probably saw as early as 1962 a need to reclaim the power which he had delegated to Liu and Teng and which had increased over the years. This in turn meant that he would have to strengthen his own base of power in the PLA and--among other things--to make at least some part of the political security apparatus directly responsive to himself.

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( The party plenum in September 1962 ended the period of retreats in domestic policy and forecast a purge of Mao's opponents. Mao himself called for the "investigation of senior cadres of the party, asked those who had made "mistakes" to admit them, revealed that two "special examination committees" had been formed, and promised that the political security apparatus would be playing a larger role in the coming "class struggle." ) He also took two organizational steps at this time: he installed the political security specialists Kang Sheng and Lo Jui-ching on Teng Hsiao-ping's secretariat, and he reorganized and greatly augmented the Central Control Commission under a new man.

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Other key components of the political security apparatus may have undergone significant changes in this 1960-62 period. Mao's old bodyguard Wang Tung-hsing returned to the staff office. The Social Affairs Department may finally have been abolished, but, if not, may have been renamed the Security Department and placed under Lo Jui-ching. And by late 1962 Mao may have been shaping up a personal investigative body outside the party apparatus, possibly working under Kang Sheng but responsive to himself.

In spring 1963, Mao drafted a ten-point program designed to restore collective controls in rural areas --a program he was later to denounce Liu Shao-chi for subverting. At the same time, he launched a campaign to eliminate "bourgeois influence" from the arts.

Late in 1963, in an unmistakable expression of his distrust of the party apparatus, Mao issued his call to "learn from the PLA." This turn to the PLA found expression in early 1964 in the introduction into government organs of the PLA's political officer system. This new network, increasingly staffed by PLA officers, took over the agitprop function. The new offices were made responsive to several reorganized functional departments of the party, reportedly under the supervision of Peng Chen. The political offices also gave Mao a supplementary system --to the existing control commissions--for investigating and evaluating party members.

In June 1964, Mao made known his concern about "revolutionary successors,"

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In July, the party set forth a 15-point program to cleanse itself of revisionism, and pointed publicly to the threat from the top level of the party. The press soon called for a purge.

At about the same time, Mao named Peng Chen to head a special five-man group--bypassing the party apparatus--to look into the condition of Chinese "culture." This was a political security mission--to assess the threat from "revisionist" writers and their sponsors--underlined

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by the assignment to the group of Kang Sheng. It was probably at this time that Peng Chen was added to the politburo's standing committee, giving Mao (he thought) a clear majority even in his absence.

The party issued in September 1964 a revised draft of Mao's ten-point program of spring 1963, a revision which took a gloomy view of China's situation and focussed its criticism on basic-level cadres. Mao blamed Liu for the failings of this draft. At the same time, the party press spelled out, in ominous terms, Mao's principles for judging revolutionary successors.

It is uncertain whether Mao had decided by this time to purge Liu. Such a decision, however, would be consistent with some actions taken and others possibly taken in the second half of 1964. Changes were definitely made in the leadership of the Ministry of Public Security and of the central committee staff office. The Central Control Commission may have been told to stand down. And the Social Affairs Department or Political Security Department, if it still existed, may have been put out of business at this time.

Teng Hsiao-ping may have fallen far in this period, possibly following a secret denunciation by Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih. Mao reportedly "criticized" Teng late in 1964.

In any case, the promulgation of the "23 points" at a party work conference in January 1965--not published at the time--clearly reflected an intention to purge some party leaders, possibly including Liu and Teng. This document sharply criticized positions which Liu had taken in party meetings, and promised action against those "in authority" high in the party.

By early 1965, both Mao and Lin Piao had apparently come to distrust Lo Jui-ching, who had been their own protege. However, Lo remained chief-of-staff, with the power to order troops into action.

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Peng Chen seems to have fallen from favor in or about mid-July 1965. A meeting of Peng's five-man group (set up a year earlier) apparently gave Kang Sheng an opportunity to discredit him to Mao as a protector of Mao's enemies.

By early autumn the entire political security apparatus (like the entire party apparatus) was in trouble, and this was known to its supervisors and principal figures. However, the key figures of the party apparatus and security apparatus apparently made no serious effort to prevent Mao from carrying out his purge. An attempted coup at that time--while Lo Jui-ching was still in power--might conceivably have been successful.

Some of the credit for deterring a coup may belong to Mao's special political security group, which as of autumn 1965 had probably been working for Mao personally for some time. These men would have been in place, in key organs of the party apparatus and political security apparatus, acting as watchdogs and undertaking other investigative work to help Mao decide whom to purge, to give him warning if necessary, and to help him make his arrangements. This group would have included several of the following: Kang Sheng of the secretariat; Wang Tung-hsing of the central committee staff office; Chen Po-ta of the political research office; Lo Ching-chang of the SAD or PSD (if it still existed even nominally); Chang Yun-i of the Central Control Commission; and Wang Tung-hsing, Hsieh Fu-chih and Yang Chi-ching of the Ministry of Public Security. Mao's wife was probably an unattached member.

By late 1965, Mao was ready to move. He chose to move first not against the longtime supervisors of the political security apparatus, Teng and Peng, but against the most immediately dangerous man: Lo Jui-ching, the second-ranking leader of the PLA, the instrument that had to be used either to purge the party apparatus or to smash it.

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## COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS

## I. EVOLUTION, 1927-1965

Introductory Note

While the entire party-governmental-military structure in China can be regarded as a security apparatus, this paper is addressed primarily to that part of the apparatus variously described as the "party police," or "secret police," or "police intelligence service," or "internal espionage service," or "political counter-intelligence effort."

The paper is concerned in part with the public security effort, the effort to discover and suppress any form of resistance to the party's "security" (its control, policies and programs); and it is concerned marginally with those organs charged with foreign intelligence and military intelligence. But the emphasis is on those special instruments and activities designed to discover weakness--from simple unreliability through positive disloyalty--in the party, in party members; and in particular, on those designed to provide that intelligence which will prevent the development of any effective challenge to the dominant leaders of the party by other leaders.

Because the point of greatest interest is seen as Mao's effort to shape an apparatus which would help him to keep himself in power and to create a responsive party, that is the story line of the main body of the paper. Materials which would tend to obstruct the story line but are known to be of interest to some readers--for example, detailed information on the evolution and structure of components, on the conduct and results of security campaigns, and on the fortunes of second-level figures of the apparatus--are gathered in an Annex and cited at appropriate points in the text.

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The 1920s: Primitive Forms

It can be presumed that some kind of political security apparatus was operating in the Chinese Communist party from its earliest years. Some observers have reported that such an organization, concerned primarily with the loyalty and reliability of party members, existed under the name of the Political Security Bureau--as a part of the CCP central committee--as early as the late 1920s, when the bulk of the CCP's central leadership was in Shanghai.\* Others have reported that this organization did not acquire this name until it was established in the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931 or 1932, and some observers have concluded that the CCP did not have a political security apparatus--that it had only a positive intelligence service--until that time. The latter view seems in the nature of the case to be mistaken, although it may be that the political security bureau did not acquire that precise name until the early 1930s.

Teng Fa has sometimes been reported as the first chief of the Political Security Bureau (or its equivalent); but the available record does not place Teng in Shanghai in those years, and he himself in later interviews denied having held that post in those years (while admitting to it for later years). It seems likely that the political security apparatus in the late 1920s was a part of the large operation set up and run by Chou En-lai out of Shanghai, along with Ku Shun-chang (who was soon to defect to the Nationalists), Li Ko-nung (who was to remain a party security specialist until his incapacitation in 1957),

\*For example, [redacted] a party security department was "named" (established?) at the Sixth Congress of the CCP (held in Moscow) in 1928. This may be true, but the present writer does not have the record.

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Kang Sheng (similarly a lifetime security specialist, now in 1969 the principal such figure), Wu Te-feng (another lifetime specialist), and Li Wei-han, Chen Keng and Ko Ching-shih (all of whom later left security work). If Chou himself did not choose to direct the political security portion of this work, it might have been primarily in the hands of either Li or Kang.

Mao Tse-tung did not dominate the CCP in those years, and in fact was not in the central leadership or in Shanghai. Those concerned with all aspects of security work presumably reported to such party leaders as Chou, Chu Chiu-pai, and Li Li-san.

#### The Early 1930s: The Set-up in Kiangsi

The period of the early 1930s is equally hard to sort out. Most of the party's leaders were still in Shanghai in the period 1930-32 (before transferring to Mao's Kiangsi Soviet), and the party was then dominated by the Moscow-returned Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming). Some observers have concluded that Chen himself directed in that period the intelligence organization set up by Chou En-lai (who joined Mao in Kiangsi in January 1931), and it may be that Chen also directed whatever political security apparatus he felt to be necessary. Those sources who assert that Teng Fa was in Shanghai also assert that Teng continued to head this apparatus in the period 1930-32 (but his whereabouts at the time are most uncertain), and still others have said that Wang Shou-tao (who joined the Shanghai apparatus in 1930) was its director. In any case, the security and intelligence apparatus must have been badly damaged in 1931 by the capture and early defection of Ku Shun-chang and by the capture of Hsiang Chung-fa. Meanwhile, Mao in Kiangsi had already conducted a bloody purge of his opposition, with the help of his own security apparatus.

Teng Fa, Chou En-lai, Li Ko-nung and Wang Shou-tao were all in the Kiangsi Soviet by the end of 1932. Chen Chao-yu had returned to Moscow, and Kang Sheng had gone

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there too for advanced training in security work.\* Thus most reports agree that authority in the security and intelligence field was divided among Teng, Chou, Li and Wang, although sources do not agree as to which individuals held which posts at what time.

The Political Security Bureau under that name was established--or surfaced--in Kiangsi by the end of 1932, under the direction of either Teng Fa (probably) or Wang Shou-tao (possibly). Chou En-lai, who had taken over the Military Committee from Mao, seems to have been connected with the positive intelligence rather than party security function. Li Ko-nung apparently directed a subordinate Political Security Bureau for all or part of the armed forces. (See Annex, Note 2, for other important figures in security work.)

The security and intelligence apparatus was still responsible primarily to other leaders than Mao in the early 1930s: e.g. to the acting secretaries-general Chen Shao-yu and (after 1932) Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku). It is not known whether Mao as chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet had access to the product of this apparatus and had a voice in its work, and some observers have surmised that Mao, as a rival of the then dominant party leaders, was himself the object of unfriendly scrutiny by the security apparatus. However, Mao in that period was strengthening his own position and was forming close personal relationships with some of the key figures in security work.

#### The Late 30s: The Rise of Kang Sheng

In October 1934 the Chinese Communist movement was dislodged from its Kiangsi base and spent the next two years getting relocated in North China. On the March,

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\*Before going to Moscow, Kang did something very clever: he recruited into the CCP an actress named Chiang Ching.

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in January 1935, the Tsunyi conference established--in the official phrase--Mao Tse-tung's "leading position in the central organs and in the party as a whole," a position he has never lost. (See Annex, Note 1, for the principle--established at that time--of party committee "leadership" of security work.) This did not, however, prevent a dispute about the proper geographical base for the party, and during summer 1935 the forces led by Mao split off from forces led by others and proceeded separately to Shensi (Mao's choice), arriving in the autumn. Late in 1936, the CCP's headquarters was established at Yen-an, and the forces left behind in the summer of 1935 rejoined the movement.

Teng Fa is generally accepted as having continued to direct the political security apparatus throughout the Long March--after which he probably played a role in putting down an anti-Mao faction in Shensi--and at least as late as 1937, before being recast as a "labor leader." Teng himself claimed, in at least two interviews of the period, to hold the post of chief of what his interviewers rendered as the "protection bureau"--probably pao wei chu, or (Political) Security Bureau--although in one of these interviews he described his work in the past as little more than that of a militia leader. His deputy during the Long March was apparently Li Ko-nung.

In late 1937, a few months after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Kang Sheng returned from the USSR to become--it is believed--the chief of the security and intelligence apparatus.

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in later years, with the emergence of the Social Affairs Department (known to be charged with political security work), many SAD officials had leading posts concurrently in the SAD and in the Ministry of Public Security or the foreign and military intelligence organs. The surprising thing, as others have noted, is that the freshly-returned Kang was given any of these posts, at a time when the Chinese were anxious to keep the Russians themselves out of Chinese affairs. The conclusion seems unavoidable that Mao--who by the end of 1937 dominated the party sufficiently, if not absolutely--was not satisfied with Teng Fa, although the record does not show that Teng had any closer relations with Mao's earlier rivals than did Kang Sheng himself.

Li Ko-nung, who had reportedly risen to become Teng Fa's first deputy, reportedly stayed on as Kang's first deputy, both in the security apparatus as previously and now in the two positive intelligence organs ("committees") as well.\*\* Li spent most of 1938-39 as director of the 8th Red Army's Kueilin office, establishing an intelligence network there. (See Annex, Note 3, for the fortunes of others important in security work.)

Making their first appearance in the late 1930s were two party organs which were to become important parts of the political security apparatus. One was the

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\*\*As suggested above, Kang, Li and several others may have had--probably did have--security and intelligence posts concurrently.

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staff office of the secretariat (under Wang Shou-tao after 1937), which may have been from the start the main repository for the committee's classified documents. The other was the Research Office headed by Chen Po-ta, who was concurrently Mao's political secretary; at the time, this office was a component part of the propaganda department, and there is no way to judge whether its research was subordinated to that department's work or was instead (as later) "political" research undertaken for Mao personally.

### The Early 1940s: Shaping Up

In the early 1940s the Chinese Communists were mainly concerned with harassing the Japanese and with improving their overall military position for a post-war military-and-political struggle with the Nationalists. But Mao was also concerned with eliminating the only potential threat to his own position: that of the remaining Soviet-returned leaders who had some claim to superior knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and to better relations with the Soviet leaders on whose good will the eventual Chinese Communist regime would depend. The party "rectification" (cheng-feng) campaign of those years made clear that Mao's thought was a "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism and further reduced the stature of those Soviet-returned leaders regarded as rivals.

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As was to prove the case in the Cultural Revolution two decades later when Hsieh Fu-chih turned against his patron Teng Hsiao-ping, Kang's past relations with party leaders whom Mao wanted to bring down were made to work to Kang's advantage.\*

\*It was during this period (according to Lo Jui-ching in 1956), specifically in 1943, that the party developed the "correct line" for the conduct of security work. This line was said to be embodied in "nine points." While this document has not been published, subsequent materials suggest that the points included strict party leadership and supervision (a previously-established principle), mobilization of the masses, reliance on investigation rather than torture and confession, and so on.

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In the early 1940s the party apparatus, including the security apparatus, was shaping up into something like the form which it was to hold for a long time.\* By spring 1945, at the CCP's Seventh Congress, Mao was ready to make these arrangements (some of which had probably existed de facto for some time) public and official.

The congress confirmed Liu Shao-chi as the second-ranking party leader, and the new central committee added four party leaders to the politburo. Among them were Kang Sheng (ranking eighth), possibly the first security chief to be included (the record is uncertain on Teng Fa), and Peng Chen (ranking ninth), who by 1949 was to join Liu Shao-chi in supervising the work of the security apparatus. Both were also named alternate members of the secretariat, now officially charged with attending to the "daily work of the central committee" as directed by the politburo, work which would include supervision of the central departments. (Mao was named chairman of all three bodies: central committee, politburo, secretariat.) The central committee was to set up the necessary central departments under the secretariat.

One of these departments was the Social Affairs Department (surfaced at that time), to direct the party's security and intelligence work. Official biographies and obituaries suggest (without permitting a firm conclusion) that the Social Affairs Department (SAD) had existed for some years before 1945, conceivably set up as early as 1940.\* These same sources indicate that the one part of the SAD had now taken on the name of the previous political security organ, i.e., the Political Security Bureau. Other presumed parts were the intelligence components, the Friendly Region and Enemy Region Work Committees--probably soon

\*For example, Tan Cheng-wen's official obituary specifies that he was chief of the Social Affairs Department of a border region sub-bureau of the party during the Sino-Japanese war, and it implies that he held this post for a considerable period prior to 1945.

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to be reorganized, with the Sino-Japanese war's end, to give greater attention to other targets.\* There was general agreement that Kang Sheng and Li Ko-nung (also criticized during "rectification" but not very much) continued to direct the consolidated security and intelligence apparatus.

The staff office of the secretariat now emerged as the staff office of the central committee. It was headed by Yang Shang-kun, one of the lesser known Soviet-returned figures, who had been for some years secretary-general of the army's central headquarters and had taken over the staff office from Wang Shou-tao a year or so earlier. The office was officially a housekeeping office for the central committee, but even in this humble role would be sensitive, in that it handled and filed the central committee documents concerned with the full range of the party's affairs and may also have kept the personnel files of party leaders. Yang may also have been given at that time the post of first secretary in a subcommittee of the central committee known as the Committee for Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee; this body was not surfaced until 1957, but there is some evidence that it existed--and under Yang--from 1945. As this committee was later seen to be charged with supervising the conduct of campaigns in central committee organs, Yang's post in it would also have been sensitive.

Of all the organizational arrangements emerging at the time, probably the most important was the installation of the secretariat as a supervisory level between the political security apparatus and the ultimate user, Mao. This made no practical difference at the time, because Mao remained at the head of the new secretariat just as he had been the head of the old one, so in both

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\*There was much testimony that these Friendly Region and Enemy Region intelligence organizations had been effective in the years of struggle against both the Japanese and the Nationalists.

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periods sensitive security cases were passed up to an organ which Mao dominated. But this arrangement was to make a difference later, when Mao removed himself from the conduct of daily operations and gave a good deal of discretion to the supervisors of the political security apparatus.

The Seventh Congress, in addition to re-electing Kang Sheng to the central committee and naming him to the politburo and secretariat, elected as alternate members of the central committee at least two other party leaders who were or had been important in security work: Wang Shou-tao, who had been for about seven years chief of its staff office, and Lo Jui-ching, who had been for the previous five years director of the political department of the 8th Red Army and who probably assumed at about this time the post of director of the Security Department of the Military Affairs Committee. (See Annex, Note 4, for an account of other important figures in security work in the early 1940s.)

#### The Late 1940s: The Decline of Kang Sheng

With the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Chinese Communists moved quickly to get into the best possible position for negotiating-and-fighting with the Nationalists. The best forces, under Lin Piao, moved into the Northeast, and strong forces expanded their holdings in north, east, central and northwest China, still directed from Yenan. After the breakdown of negotiations in early 1947, the military initiative passed to the Communists. During 1948 it became apparent that the Communists were going to win all of mainland China, and in July 1949 Mao published his essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" which made clear two important points: that his regime would be a genuine dictatorship on the Stalinist model, and that it would take as its first task the strengthening of state organs for the suppression of "reactionaries."

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Meanwhile, the CCP had reorganized the party's political security apparatus which was to serve as the central and directing organ for public security work as well as for investigation of party members. Kang Sheng had continued as director of the Social Affairs Department until 1947 or 1948, but in 1947 (according to Mao in a 1948 speech) was doing "organizational work" in North China and in 1948 was named first secretary of the party's subburo in Shantung (his home province). Kang is said to have lost his post on the central secretariat at the same time and may have lost it on the politburo as well (certainly as an effective member)--and there seems little doubt that the provincial assignment was a demotion. The most likely explanation--judging from Liu Shao-chi's apparent role as the top-level supervisor of security work at that time, and from the delight with which Kang has pursued Liu in the Cultural Revolution--is that Kang quarreled with or otherwise failed to please Liu, who as Mao's first lieutenant for party work had the authority or influence to transfer him away from the center.\* Kang was succeeded by his deputy, Li Ko-nung, who had spent 1946-47 in the Communist delegation in Executive Headquarters in Peking (in the period of negotiations); he replaced Kang as director of the SAD in 1947 or 1948.

\*It may be that 1946-47 is the period meant in later references to the mistakes made in security work in "our civil war period." In this connection, an official CCP history presents Mao's remarks on agrarian reform in December 1947--about the time of Kang's demotion--as having been aimed inter alia at correcting such leftist errors as killing too many landlords. Moreover, Liu Shao-chi has been charged with alternating between rightist and ultra-leftist errors, and one of these latter could have occurred in the 1946-47 period. In other words, Kang in 1947 could have been held responsible--and Liu is now held responsible, after Liu's disgrace and Kang's preferment--for what was regarded at the time and is still regarded as a period of mistakes in security work.

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Apart from the armed forces themselves, the coercive state organs appearing in 1949--the visible portion of the security and intelligence apparatus--were principally the Ministry of Public Security (and its subordinate organizations), the procuratorate, and the courts. The Ministry of Public Security was formed out of the Security Department of the Military Affairs Committee of the party (not out of the Political Security Bureau of the SAD), which had reportedly existed for some years under the leadership of Lo Jui-ching. In any case, Lo was named the first Minister of Public Security, which he was to remain for 10 years.\* (He was also head of the municipal public security department in Peking, assisted by Feng Chi-ping.)

The procuratorates and the courts were not of course conceived as independent bodies, but with the police were --as Peking boasted--parts of an organic whole (referred to as the kung-chien-fa). The procuratorates were nominally responsible for supervising the conduct of public security organs, but in practice their main functions were those of authorizing whatever arrests were ordered by higher (party) authority, of preparing cases for the state after these arrests, and of prosecuting these cases in the courts. Similarly, the courts were merely another arm of the administration, disposing of serious cases to order. The work of all three types of bodies--public security, procuratorates, courts--was under the "leadership" (i.e., detailed direction) of the party.

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\*In charges following Lo's purge in 1965, Lo is said to have got off to a poor start in late 1949 by reorganizing the two divisions and one regiment defending Peking --under the command of the MAC's [Public] Security Department--into a central public security column directly subordinate to the MPS. (Peking did in fact announce in November 1949 the formation of such a column, under Wu Lieh.) Mao is said to have reprimanded Lo for this. The issue of command structure was soon to arise again.

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There were two more visible portions of the security and intelligence apparatus, both established in 1949 and both concerned with intelligence. One was the Information (Intelligence) Administration attached to the Government Administration Council (later State Council), concerned with intelligence on foreign affairs, and headed by Tsou Ta-peng, concurrently secretary-general of the SAD (assisted by Wang Shao-chun and Chin Kung); and the other was the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, concerned with military intelligence, and reportedly headed by Li Ko-nung (the SAD chief).

The party organs to which all of these public bodies were responsive remained much more important in political security work. At the top was the party secretariat, headed by Mao and Liu Shao-chi, which provided guidance to the public organs through their party committees and received reports from those committees. By this time, Liu himself was the principal secretariat-level supervisor of all security and intelligence work, with Peng Chen assisting him.\* At the center of the work was the Social Affairs Department,

\*The division of the work of collating and evaluating information, and disposing of cases, is conjectural. It seems likely, however, that the security apparatus itself, in coordination with the appropriate party committees, evaluated and disposed of the simplest and least sensitive cases (e.g. most of those shaken out in mass campaigns which were not simply given back to the masses to deal with); and that the supervisors of the security apparatus, especially Liu and Peng, evaluated and disposed of more important cases (e.g. most party members above county level); and that Mao himself evaluated and disposed of the most sensitive cases (central committee members, central leaders), in consultation with the supervisors. Such an arrangement, giving a good deal of discretion to the supervisors, could work only so long as Mao trusted the supervisors.

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which unquestionably provided some part of the guidance for the work of the public bodies and which in any case used these bodies freely for its own work of investigating party members. The Ministry of Public Security, like the positive intelligence organs, was headed from the start (just below Lo's level) by figures with concurrent leading posts in the SAD, and the MPS was to have from the start a large role in the SAD's work. While the precise relationship was not clear, the apparent scheme was for the Political Security Bureau of the SAD to work with the political security bureaus of the party's organization department and general political department in investigating party members in party organs and in the armed forces respectively\*; and to employ the much larger apparatus of the Ministry of Public Security--working primarily through the MPS's own political security bureau--for investigations of other kinds and for arrests of all kinds. But it may not have been as neat as this; that is, the MPS apparatus may sometimes have been used even for sensitive investigations, and the SAD may have made some of the arrests itself. (See Annex, Notes 5 and 6, for the organization of the MPS and SAD, and for an account of the key figures of both.)

The staff office of the central committee remained an important part of the security and intelligence apparatus. It was known to keep the files of all central committee documents

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Such files might have included

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files duplicating those kept in the SAD, as this would be a means of preventing an ambitious SAD official from altering the files for a political venture. Moreover, the staff office was now known to provide some part (perhaps all) of the physical protection of the top party leaders, including Mao--which in itself would make this office very sensitive. Beyond this, the staff office may have kept the personnel records of the top officials of the security and intelligence apparatus itself. The only known officers of the staff office in the late 40s were Yang Shang-kun, who continued as its director, and Wang Tung-hsing (now in 1969 its director), who emerged in about 1947 as chief of its Security Department--not the Political Security Bureau of the staff office but rather the above-cited component charged with physical security. In any case, the work of the staff office seems to have been inextricably entangled with that of the SAD.

The CCP also authorized in 1949--although this was not known at the time--the establishment of "discipline inspection committees." These (it was later said) were to investigate violations of law and discipline by party members. The original distinction between their work and that of the political security apparatus--an imprecise distinction and one probably difficult to observe in practice--seems to have been the difference between a concern with the obedience of party members to directives and a concern with their loyalty to the dominant leaders. In any case, these committees were the precursors of the party control commissions established in 1955, and were abolished when the latter were set up. At the provincial level, the heads of these committees were often if not always the directors of the provincial organization departments and the national head may have been the director of the central committee's organization department (first Jen Pi-shih, who died in 1950, and then, de facto, Peng Chen).

To recapitulate the status and relationships of the most important components of the political security apparatus, as of 1949: at the top, supervising it, the secretariat, in particular Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen; off to one side, the central committee staff office, the


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## THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS, c. 1949

(Nominal subordinations in government and military structures are not shown.)



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main repository of classified records, and responsible for the physical protection of party leaders; at the center, the Social Affairs Department, charged with investigating the loyalty of party members, working with the political security bureaus of other departments to this end and with the Ministry of Public Security; subordinate to the SAD, the Ministry of Public Security, providing a supplementary apparatus to the SAD for investigations and arrests, but concerned primarily with non-party people; and emerging parallel with the SAD, the discipline inspection committees, investigating the probity of party members.

### The Early 50s: Failure of the Apparatus

In the Peking regime's first few years, it was occupied mainly with the prosecution of the Korean war, the restoration of the economy, and the establishment of totalitarian controls over Chinese society. The latter began with a bloody campaign against counter-revolutionaries in 1950-51, soon followed by a campaign against corruption and other evils, and the concurrent purge of several leaders in security work. During 1953, however, the real threat emerged not from the populace but from the politburo itself--the challenge by Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih to Mao's structuring of the hierarchy. Thus the party in 1954 purged Kao and Jao and others, abolished the regional administrations, designed a new control commission for the party, and made some changes in the security apparatus. The Kao-Jao case brought Kang Sheng back to Peking, where for a year or so he seemed again to be the foremost figure in the security and intelligence field.

Before launching the first campaign in 1950, the party had its first top-level security and intelligence conference. This was presided over by Liu Shao-chi (strengthening the judgment that Liu was the principal secretariat-level supervisor of all security and intelligence work), and with Li Ko-nung in a prominent role. The conference apparently surfaced the first of a series of disputes about the conduct of such work.

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[redacted] an SAD leader from South China made a speech to the conference which was promptly denounced by Chen Lung, a dispute (they assert) later mediated by Li Ko-nung.\* This latter is one of several indications that Li in the early 1950s--at least until 1954--remained the ranking figure in political security work.

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Shortly after the Korean war began (June 1950), the regime began to round up "counter-revolutionaries" systematically. In this first stage of the campaign, according to Lo Jui-ching and others later, the regime was too lenient. This fault was corrected by February 1951, when Peking published its "Regulations for the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries"--regulations which were retroactive and very severe--and began the intensive phase of the campaign. By mid-1951 the victims--principally ex-Nationalist officials, ex-Nationalist soldiers, landlords, intellectuals, and Chinese with foreign connections--were in the millions.\*\* The party later confessed that there had been excesses in this campaign, attributing them to Lo Jui-ching; but there is no doubt that the impetus came from Mao himself.

The party adopted during this campaign some "Regulations for the Protection of State Secrets" which made it dangerous for anyone to open his mouth at all, except to shout applause or denunciation on cue. The party also adopted at this time, according to Lo Jui-ching later,

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\*The loser, Chen Po, and his associate in South China, Chen Kun, were both imprisoned; Chen Kung died there in 1952, after torture.

\*\*Two independent calculations of the time, extrapolating from provincial figures, put the executions at between two and three million. The total may have been much higher, as Peking may not have been counting those "spontaneously" murdered by the "masses" (rather than executed by state organs). Many millions more were socially and economically ruined.

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some cautionary stipulations about some kinds of arrests. One of these provided that members of the party could not be acted against--that is, not investigated, not arrested, and not executed--without instructions from superior party committees. This simply spelled out the principle of "party leadership" of everything, but it would be an important provision if adhered to, as it would impede the formation of a personal security apparatus.

Late in 1951 the regime turned its attention to the problems of corruption, waste, and bureaucracy, and to the need for an ideological remolding.

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By mid-1952, several important figures in the SAD and public security apparatus in East China, South China, and Central-South China (but not including any of the handful of key leaders previously discussed) had been removed.

During 1953, Mao became alarmed by indications that two of his top lieutenants--Kao Kang, the party chief in the Northeast recently brought to Peking for a national role, and Jao Shu-shih, the party chief in East China recently brought in to head the organization department--were seeking greater power for themselves and thus in effect were challenging Mao himself. Kao is said to have sought to displace both Liu Shao-chi as Mao's first lieutenant for party affairs and Chou En-lai as premier. Jao's initiative was hardly less serious, as the organization department played a role ancillary to the SAD in investigating and evaluating party members and played an equally important role in giving them their work assignments. Mao in December 1953 reportedly proposed action to "strengthen party unity"; Kao and Jao disappeared in January, and in February Liu Shao-chi told a party plenum of the threat posed by "independent kingdoms."

Reflecting the fall of Kao and Jao, important changes came to light in the next few months. In May 1954, Teng Hsiao-ping, brought in from the Southwest in 1952, emerged

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in the new post of secretary-general of the party, i.e. as the director of the party's daily work, and was soon identified as a full member of the politburo. During 1954, the party decided to abolish all of its regional bureaus (which had been bases for Kao and Jao) and bring the remaining regional leaders into Peking, and to set up a new central Control Commission to replace its "discipline inspection committees." At the same time, Kang Sheng, onetime chief of the political security apparatus, returned triumphantly--almost certainly at Mao's insistence--to Peking from his exile in Shantung.\*

The political security apparatus had apparently failed to discover the Kao-Jao conspiracy at the early stage that it should have discovered it, and it thus had failed its first big test. Liu Shao-chi apparently managed to slip the responsibility for the failure. Instead, Peng Chen was held in part responsible; he was rapidly dislodged by Teng Hsiao-ping as Liu Shao-chi's first lieutenant for party affairs and for supervision of the political security apparatus. Li Ko-nung seems also to have been held in part responsible; Kang Sheng for some time thereafter seemed to displace Li as the foremost figure in security work, possibly as the head of an ad hoc commission examining the entire security apparatus, or possibly even the director of the Social Affairs Department itself again.\*\*

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\*Kang may have played an important role in the belated discovery of the Kao-Jao plot. He had been Jao's subordinate in the East China Bureau, and in a good position to observe at least part of Jao's operations. It is conceivable that Kao and Jao approached Kang for support, thinking him susceptible as an exiled and disaffected figure.

\*\*The latest date for the existence of the SAD (apart from the questionable Tibetan press), to be publicly admitted by an official Chinese Communist source, is 1953, or by implication 1955. A recent Hong Kong Daily attack on Wen Min-sheng states that he was named director of the Social Affairs Department of the South China Subburo in 1963, and it implies that he kept this position until the regional bureaus were abolished in 1955.

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By December Kang was again identified as a full member of the politburo, and was ranked sixth in the lists in early 1955. Shortly thereafter, Li Ko-nung was identified as a new deputy chief-of-staff of the PLA; there was a genuine security task for him there, as Kao and Jao had been accused inter alia of soliciting support from PLA leaders, and Li could have remained director of the SAD in the post, as he probably had been in his role as a deputy minister of foreign affairs after 1949; but, if so, he was probably working under Kang Sheng's supervision and scrutiny. (There is yet another possibility, of course: that in 1954-55 the post of director of the SAD was held neither by Kang nor by Li but by Lo Jui-ching. Lo might be thought, as the supervisor of several SAD leaders in their concurrent posts as deputy ministers of public security, to have had an important SAD post anyway, and his reported role as director of the political security bureau of the General Political Department as of 1955 would imply that he had an SAD hat; but the bulk of the evidence seems to indicate that, if he were the temporary director of the SAD at any time, it was in a later period, after the disablement of Li Ko-nung.)

In any case, the Kao-Jao "anti-party alliance" was surfaced at a party conference in March 1955. Teng Hsiao-ping led the public attack, and Kang Sheng was among those making "important speeches." (Li and Lo were not so described.) This conference expelled Kao (a suicide) and Jao (in prison), and--citing the Kao-Jao case as proving the need--passed a resolution establishing central and local control commissions in the party apparatus. These were to replace the discipline inspection committees, which had normally been headed by directors of organization departments, the apparatus controlled by the just-purged Jao Shu-shih. These new commissions were to work under the direction of the party committees of each level and in close coordination with the state security organs, and were to "strengthen discipline and to struggle against all violations" (of the party constitution, party regulations, and state laws) by party members--or, more sharply, to "keep a strict, constant, systematic supervision of every area, department and party worker from top to bottom and back again." The control commissions were

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empowered to take disciplinary action against members of party committees of lower levels (e.g. the central control commission against the provincial party committee, the provincial against the county), but could not take action against members of party committees of the same level. As this principle applied to the central committee, the central control commission apparently (the language is opaque) was empowered to investigate members of the central committee itself, if directed by the central committee (i.e. secretariat) to do so, but would have to report its results to the central committee (i.e. secretariat) itself for action. The central control commission at this time was placed nominally in the hands of the old and spent Tung Pi-wu, and it was not known who would supply whatever strength the new instrument would have.

At the same party meeting, the politburo added Lin Piao, who had been Mao's favorite military leader but sick and inactive for years. It was not clear at the time whether Lin was to play any significant role.

With the party leadership again in order (Mao apparently thought), Mao himself discovered that the "remnant counter-revolutionaries" had taken advantage of the party's preoccupation to attempt a "resurgence." Again the masses were mobilized, concentrating on "sabotage," most of which seems to have been inadvertent errors in work. ((See Annex, Note 7, for Mao's figure for those "liquidated" before 1955; and for Peking's figure for those convicted in this 1955 campaign.))

During the 1955 campaign, as in 1951-52, a number of second-level regional figures in the security apparatus were purged. These included additional figures from East China (including Pan Han-nien) and from South China.

The organization of security work in the early 1950s--especially the division of responsibilities among the various components of the Chinese Communist apparatus as a whole and of the security apparatus in particular--was a very complex and cloudy question, and various observers of the period arrived at various answers. One thing that seems fairly clear is that, probably as a

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result of the security and intelligence conference of early 1950, the most important component--the Social Affairs Department--began in 1950 to divest itself of some of its functions and part of its apparatus. (For example, SAD party committees at lower levels were reportedly eliminated by 1953). Such reports led some observers to conclude that by about 1953 the SAD had put itself out of business: that (as they saw it) the matter of the loyalty and reliability of party members was being handled by the organization department and of non-Communist party leaders by the united front department; and that, since the political screening of the rest of the populace was being carried out by the political security bureaus of the Ministry of Public Security, the SAD was left with nothing to do. Other observers concluded somewhat more cautiously that by 1955--as a result of transfers of functions and personnel from the SAD to other party departments (including the new control commissions), the Ministry of Public Security, and agencies concerned with foreign and military intelligence--the SAD maintained only "indirect influence" over security work through its guidance of the MPS and its recommendations to the politburo. Yet other observers reached what the present writer regards as a sounder conclusion: that the SAD, as a result of changes made from 1950 to 1955, was relieved of its less critical functions, in other words was stripped down by 1955 in order to handle most efficiently its most important work: the handling of the most sensitive political security cases (notably those involving party leaders), and the supervision of other important aspects of security and intelligence work.

With regard to the critical matter of whether the SAD relinquished to some other department or agency the handling of the cases of party leaders,

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the SAD did not give this up in the 1950s. The SAD was not, of course, unsupervised in this work; it could not conduct an investigation, or order the MPS to make an arrest, of a party leader unless authorized to do so by the party secretariat; Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, and (from 1954) Teng Hsiao-ping were these supervisors. But once an investigation or arrest had been

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decided on, the political security bureau of the SAD seems normally to have been given the job of carrying it out or assigning the action. Thus, while the organization department (like the general political department) did indeed have a political security bureau, this bureau was not transferred from the SAD but remained instead an office responsive to the SAD (as well as to party committees concerned). In other words, as previously noted, the political security bureau of the SAD worked with the analogous bureau of the organization department in investigating party members in party organs. Moreover, from 1954, with the disgrace and purge of the organization department's director (Jao Shu-shih), it would seem inescapably to follow that the role of the organization department in security work would be reduced, not enhanced.

In the operational conduct of investigations and arrests, the SAD evidently continued to have available for its use the apparatus of the Ministry of Public Security, in particular the political security bureaus of the MPS which extended down to the county level under (as reported) different names.

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(See Annex, Note 8, for detail on the organization of the MPS apparatus in this period.)

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Thus the new central control commission provided an additional instrument for the investigation of party members. Part of the reason for having two or more party organs concerned with this work was of course (as others have noted) the deliberate duplication or overlapping of assignments--as a check on the work--which is part of the system. But the SAD and the control commissions did seem to have, at least at the start, the same difference in emphasis that there had been between the discipline inspection committees and the SAD--the difference between investigating obedience and investigating loyalty. It may also have been intended from the start that the control commissions, if uncovering derogatory information of any kind on a national party leader, would turn the case over to the SAD--meaning that all cases were supersensitive at this level, the only level from which an effective challenge to Mao could come.

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The staff office of the central committee continued in this period to be involved in the work of the political security apparatus. Yang Shang-kun--like Li Ko-nung, Lo Jui-ching, and other leaders in this work--apparently took part in the conference of early 1950, and [redacted]

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[redacted] was involved in the purge of SAD officials in South China in the early 1950s. [redacted]

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[redacted] the staff office was responsible for the assignment of cadres to the political security apparatus, or at least that it acted as a clearing-house for such appointments, like the CPSU's Administrative Department in the 1950s. Yang had a continuing relationship with portions of the security apparatus in any case, in his post as head of the committee for party organs directly under the central committee. And the staff office is known to have provided physical protection for Mao and other leaders (e.g. on Mao's early 1950 trip to Moscow) in these years.

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The intelligence agencies themselves remained just that, with no known political security role. The Information (Intelligence) Administration was abolished in 1952 and reconstituted (under the same director, Tsou Ta-peng) as the Liaison Department, remained concerned with foreign intelligence, and continued to be staffed in part by personnel of the SAD.\* The Intelligence Department of the General Staff, concerned with military intelligence, remained under Li Ko-nung until about 1953 and then reportedly came under another, not fully-identified SAD officer.

The Political Research Office of the central committee was occasionally identified in this period. This was the office originally attached to the Propaganda

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Department and believed to be subordinated to that department at that time. However, in the early 1950s it may have been placed directly under the central committee (thus coming within the purview of Yang Shang-kun), and may have enlarged its investigative role.

Throughout the early 1950s,

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there were disputes about the principles governing security work. The most important of these revolved around the issue of party leadership and the general approach to the work.

(See Annex, Note 9, for a discussion of these disputes.)

As noted previously, the supervisors of security and intelligence work in the early 1950s were Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen (throughout) and (from about 1954) Teng Hsiao-ping, who soon dislodged Peng as Liu's principal lieutenant in this field as well as in party work as a whole. The key figures of the central political security apparatus itself in the early 1950s--at least until 1954, when the Kao-Jao case and the return of Kang Sheng placed the apparatus and its leaders in a state of some insecurity--were apparently five. First in importance was Li Ko-nung, the probable director of the SAD, at least until Kang's return, and a deputy C/S and deputy chairman of the MAC after that time. Next was Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public Security, first secretary of the ministry's party committee, from 1954 director of the staff office coordinating ministries concerned with security, and by 1955 possibly head of the political security bureau of the general political department (replacing Kan Szu-chi or Chin Kung). Not far behind were Yang Shang-kun, director of the central committee's staff office and from 1955 a deputy secretary-general of the party (under Teng); Yang Chi-ching, senior deputy minister of public security and head of its political security bureau, with a concurrent SAD post, who spent two years of this period in the central-south cleaning up a disgraced regional command and then operating it; and Hsu Tzu-jung, the second-ranking deputy minister (from 1952) and head of its staff office, with a similar concurrent SAD post. (See Annex, Note 10, for lesser figures of the central apparatus and for key figures of the regional apparatus.)

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The Late 1950s: The Onrush of Teng Hsiao-ping

The most remarkable feature of the period from mid-1955 to the autumn of 1959 was the way in which Teng Hsiao-ping consolidated his position in the party apparatus as a whole and strengthened his grip on the political security apparatus in particular. By late 1959, aided by such unforeseen developments as the second decline of Kang Sheng, the disablement of Li Ko-nung, and the need for Lo Jui-ching in another role, Teng appeared to have in his own hands or in the hands of his close associates and proteges the control of every key part of the political security apparatus--the (supervising) secretariat, the Social Affairs Department, the Ministry of Public Security, the central committee staff office, and the central control commission. In the same period, however, a sleeper began to stir and to strengthen his own position with Mao, in the party leadership, and in a powerful rival apparatus: Lin Piao, rising to become by late 1959 the foremost military figure.

Kang Sheng began to slide again in the second half of 1955, failing to hold his position as sixth-ranking member of the politburo. If as surmised he had been heading an ad hoc commission examining security work in the light of the Kao-Jao case or had resumed as director of the SAD, by early 1956 it seemed either that his work was over or that he had again been found unsatisfactory in it. It looks as though Liu Shao-chi (who had managed once before to exile him), reinforced now by Teng Hsiao-ping, a new favorite of both Mao and Liu who saw Kang as a rival for control of the political security apparatus, again persuaded Mao to allow him to find some other kind of work for Kang. In early 1956 Kang began to appear in other roles, inappropriate (one would think) for a man whose main work was in the field of political security. In March, for example, he was the CCP's delegate to the East German Communist conference, and soon thereafter he received some musicians, presaging his transfer to "cultural" and ideological work.

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The CCP's 8th Congress in September 1956 made it apparent that Teng Hsiao-ping, not a national figure at all until 1952, had now become Liu Shao-chi's first lieutenant for party work, as Liu had long been Mao's first. Teng gave the report on the new party Constitution, was named to the new standing committee of the politburo (the old secretariat, with Teng added) and was named to head the new secretariat charged with the central committee's "daily work" (Teng's old post of secretary-general, with his old deputies and some additions). Teng was the only person named to all three of the top organs (politburo, standing committee, secretariat) and was confirmed as the fourth-ranking leader (behind Mao, Liu, and Chou En-lai) of the party. As Mao was to explain ten years later, these arrangements were intended to place Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping on the "first line" of party work where Liu could preside over the routine regular meetings of the standing committee and Teng could attend to the "daily operations" of the party, permitting Mao himself to stand back on the "second line" and provide general guidance--a delegation of power which Mao was to repent as a "mistake."

The 8th Congress also confirmed the decline of Kang Sheng, dropping him to an alternate membership on the politburo (from sixth all the way to 22nd place), and on the central committee list to rank below such other security specialists as Lo Jui-ching and Li Ko-nung. Kang played no role at the congress, whereas Lo gave one of the important reports.

Other appointments made by the Congress strengthened Teng's position over and in the political security apparatus, although he was not yet clearly the principal supervisor of this apparatus. Yang Shang-kun, Teng's deputy secretary-general and director of the central committee staff office, was named to Teng's new secretariat. Liu Lan-tao, another deputy secretary-general, was also named to the new secretariat and concurrently senior deputy director of the central control commission--the only person named to both bodies. Wang Tsung-wu, a wartime associate of Teng's, was also named a deputy director of the central control commission--probably the effective director, as the nominal director was feeble and the other

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deputies had other key posts. And Hsu Tzu-jung, another wartime comrade of Teng's, was the only deputy minister of public security named (with Lo) to the central committee and thus became the senior deputy, dislodging a man not close to Teng: Hsu was soon to become the reported head of the confidential registry of the central committee's staff office. Another member of Teng's secretariat, Tan Cheng, was soon to take over the general political department. The top posts of the SAD and of the Ministry of Public Security, however, remained for a time in the hands of men not close to Teng. The SAD probably had been returned to Li Ko-nung, named for the first time to the central committee as a full member and ranking over Kang Sheng--clearly a vote of confidence for Li; and the MPS was of course still under Lo Jui-ching.

In May 1957, Mao discovered that he had made a dangerous mistake. The mistake had been made in trying to correct an earlier mistake--the persecution of intellectuals in 1954 and 1955, which had reduced their ability and inclination to do useful work. The correction had taken the form of a "hundred flowers" campaign, launched in 1956 and reaffirmed by Mao himself in unprecedentedly liberal terms in his "contradictions" speech of February 1957--a speech which encouraged criticism of the CCP from outside the party.\* Related to this was another "rectification" (correction of work) campaign in the party itself, launched on May Day 1957. In forums held in May, however, many intellectuals struck hard at the CCP's monopoly of power, its methods, and its basic policies. Mao swiftly responded by publishing a revised version of his February speech which forbade fundamental criticism, and by launching an "anti-rightist" campaign. (The party pretended at the time that the "hundred flowers" had been designed from the start as a trap for dissidents; it had not, but Mao learned from it that such a trap could be set--and this too was to be a feature of the Cultural

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\*This principle was to operate again in the Cultural Revolution a decade later.

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Revolution.) Shortly thereafter, by which time many "rightists" had been brought down, Mao merged the two campaigns into a nation-wide "rectification" campaign. He put the conduct of this campaign in the hands of Teng Hsiao-ping, who in September gave the party's report on it.\*

In October 1957 Teng probably took another giant step forward. In that month Li Ko-nung (who made his last appearance on 3 October) was disabled by a stroke; he never again played any significant role in the CCP's affairs, although he made one more appearance (in 1960) and lingered on until 1962. The post of director of the SAD--the most important in the field of security and intelligence, apart from that of the supervisor of this work--was now open for Teng to fill, or at least to make recommendations to Mao and Liu as to Li's successor. It is possible that Lo Jui-ching for a time assumed the SAD post concurrently with that of the MPS; and it is also possible (judging from the content and tone of his September 1959 speech) that Liu Lan-tao of the central control

\*Kang Sheng might have seemed a natural choice to direct or to help to direct the "rectification" campaign, in view of his background and the presumed desire to get him out of regular security work, but the campaign was evidently thought too important to be given him. He was absent from the news for about six months after the 8th Congress; later materials indicate that in this period, possibly on behalf of the Political Research Office of the central committee, he was conducting an investigation of farm machinery stations and instructing them to do research in support of a mechanization policy Mao favored. From April, Kang appeared in a number of humble roles of a common type: talking to artists, addressing teachers of Marxism-Leninism, talking to a forum of party cadres transferred to cultural and educational work, etc. By October 1957 his transformation seemed complete: he was now a "cultural" and ideological specialist.

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commission--who had been out of sight for a year after the 8th Congress--took over the SAD in a time; but it seems more likely that Teng kept them both out of it. If Teng filled this post at all, it was probably with himself. He himself probably directed the work of the SAD for all or most of the rest of the life of the SAD, either in the post of director or in his post as secretariat-level supervisor of the security and intelligence apparatus.

The party is known to have held an intelligence conference in that same month (October 1957), probably an emergency conference in response to Li's disablement. Teng probably presided (he is known to have presided over the next one, a few months later), and it seems likely that the new arrangements were made known at that time \*

In May 1958 Teng gave one of the two principal reports to another session of the party congress (on his late 1957 trip to Moscow with Mao, irrelevant to this paper), and by this time he was being described as one of Mao's "close comrades" (one of five). A plenum following added to the politburo Teng's protege from Szechuan, Li Ching-chuan. It also added the onetime security and intelligence specialist Ko Ching-chih, like Li a regional leader. And it added as a fifth vice-chairman of the central committee, and as a member of the standing committee of the politburo, the apparently still inactive Lin Piao.

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\*It seems clear that Kang Sheng was not retooled once again to take over the SAD. Kang in October was concerned with cadres assigned to the management of "socialist universities," and in the winter of 1957-58 he continued to appear in his post-Congress role, writing an article on the importance to China of the October Revolution, touring the colleges, consulting on the editing and publishing of Chinese classics, and speaking to educationalists on combining education and production. He was not identified at either of the intelligence conferences of October 1957 and May 1958.

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And in June Teng appeared with Mao to receive delegates to a public security conference. By this time, mid-1958, there was enough material to support a conjecture that Teng was now the principal supervisor of the security and intelligence apparatus. This conjecture was soon confirmed--inter alia, by officials of the apparatus, who spoke of it as "Teng's."

By the end of 1958, Mao was again--as in mid-1957--forced to recognize that his regime was in trouble, and to find someone to blame. The headlong pursuit of the "leap forward" and the commune program was now forcing a partial retreat, and the blame was of course assigned to the implementation rather than the conception. At a December 1958 plenum Mao revealed his decision to resign as chairman of the government (while remaining chairman of the party).<sup>\*</sup> The combination of the retreat and the resignation led many observers to conclude that Mao had been forced out. While this was clearly not true (because he retained the far more important party post), even at the time it seemed very likely that some of his lieutenants were dissatisfied with his conduct of the party's affairs

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and it seemed likely too that Mao would draw this same conclusion.\* Thus there seemed a need for a fresh emphasis on the most important function of the political security apparatus--to prevent the development of an effective challenge to Mao.

Teng Hsiao-ping and other members of his secretariat remained active throughout the winter of 1958-59 and the

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spring of 1959, obviously enlarging the secretariat's role--for example, by making high-powered inspection tours. Then in July and August, at the Lushan plenum, a challenge to Mao was in fact made. Throughout that summer, Teng was out of the news, presumably playing some role in the containment of the challenge.

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The challenge was formulated in Defense Minister Peng Te-huai's mid-July letter to Mao questioning the conception and conduct of the "leap" and the commune program, including the basic Maoist concepts informing those programs--which of course amounted to questioning Mao's overall leadership. Mao promptly denounced his critics as "right opportunists," and the plenum reaffirmed the essential correctness of Mao's policies. There was now clearly the task, for the security apparatus, of discovering the rest of Mao's opponents, as this opposition was fraught with danger for the future of the party and of the People's Liberation Army."

Because Peng and several of his principal supporters were ranking figures in the PLA and the defense establishment (Peng himself had been Defense Minister since 1954 and *de facto* chief of the Military Affairs Committee of the party for some years, and one of his co-challengers was chief-of-staff), there was an urgent need to reorganize the high command and to increase the effectiveness of security work in (i.e., against) the PLA.\* The two principal measures taken to this end were to appoint the intensely loyal Lin Piao as Minister of Defense and *de facto*

\*Tan Cheng, the director of the General Political Department and thus mainly responsible for the political condition of the PLA, was a casualty of the Peng Te-huai case; although it is not clear whether he was charged at the time with complicity or even sympathy, he was demoted in 1960 or 1961

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chairman of the MAC, and to name the security specialist Lo Jui-ching (long associated with Lin) as chief-of-staff. Teng Hsiao-ping now had another key position--Minister of Public Security--open to fill with someone close to himself. He filled it at once with Hsieh Fu-chih, his longtime protege in the Southwest who had been for six years the first secretary in Yunnan. Hsieh was also named to Lo's post as director of the staff office coordinating public security work. Teng now seemed in a very strong position indeed, either for containing a challenge to Mao or for making one himself. As it proved, however, it was Lin Piao who was to maneuver more adroitly in the years ahead.\*

Throughout the late 1950s, the most interesting organizational question was that of whether the party was phasing out the Social Affairs Department in favor of the control commissions. The commissions began in 1957 to move forward aggressively--against violations of "discipline" by party members--and continued on this course in 1958 and 1959, working under the leadership of party committees at all levels. Several provincial-level purges of party leaders (including central committee members) were surfaced in the latter half of 1958, and leaders of the central control commission spoke authoritatively on political security problems in 1959, inter alia defending the principle of leadership by party committees. The party remained silent about the SAD.

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It was not clear, as of 1959, whether the party meant to close out the SAD after the control commissions proved able to do the job, or (as seems more likely) meant to keep the SAD or PSB for the most sensitive security cases (the loyalty of party leaders) and as the coordinator of all kinds of security work. (See Annex, Note 11, for a detailed discussion of the status of the control commissions and the SAD in the late 1950s.)

\*Teng was probably hurt badly by Hsieh's defection in the Cultural Revolution; Teng, like Mao, could guess wrong.

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Throughout the late 1950s, the Ministry of Public Security was the most visible part of the security apparatus. Lo Jui-ching twice in 1956 and again in 1958 reported on the work of suppressing "counter-revolutionaries," revealing that in the 1955-57 campaign more than 100,000 had been found in the modernized sector of Chinese society, including 5,000 in the party itself. The campaign intensified in 1958 and continued into 1959; Lo was later criticized for excesses, persisting into 1959, but there is little doubt that he was carrying out Mao's policy. (See Annex, Note 12, for a detailed account of the work of the MPS in the late 1950s.)

The central committee's staff office remained in this period an important part of the political security apparatus. In addition to keeping sensitive documents and (possibly) personnel files, providing protection for party leaders, and (probably) playing a role in the assignment of cadres to the political security apparatus, it began no later than 1955 to record the proceedings of meetings of party leaders, including Mao's conversations on his trips. Yang Shang-kun was now in a position to know more about the central committee's business and its leaders than anyone except Mao, Liu and Teng. (See Annex, Note 13, for a further account of the staff office in these years.)


The foreign intelligence apparatus--previously the Information Administration of the State Council, then the Liaison Department--was reconstituted as the Investigation Department of the central committee in 1956, with Tsou Ta-peng remaining at its head.

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## THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS, 1959



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With Teng Hsiao-ping now clearly the dominant figure in security and intelligence work, with the three big names of earlier years--Kang Sheng, Li Ko-nung, and Lo Jui-ching--now missing from this field, and with the control commissions coming on strong, the security and intelligence apparatus as of 1959 had much the same form but a different look and tighter organization. (See graphic, opposite.)

At the top, in the party secretariat, as supervisors of all this work, were Teng and (with less authority) Peng Chen. With Teng and Peng on the secretariat were Liu Lantao and Yang Shang-kun (the two top-ranking alternates), both with concurrent key posts in the security and intelligence apparatus. (Tan Cheng, by the end of 1959, was there only nominally.)

Directly subordinate to the Secretariat were all of the key components of the security and intelligence apparatus:

(1) The central committee's staff office, with the known functions of administering the central committee's affairs, keeping the central committee's documents, including verbatim accounts of party meetings and probably including some part of the personnel files of party leaders (including political security leaders), and of protecting party leaders, and a probable role in assigning leaders to the political security apparatus. Yang Shang-kun remained the head of this, with Tseng San, Li Chieh-po and Kung Tzu-jung appearing in these years as deputy directors, Hsu Tzu-jung of the SAD and MPS as head of the Confidential Registry, and Wang Tung-hsing and Li Fu-kun as head of the bodyguards department. (Both Yang and Wang were observed to have a close personal relationship with Mao in these years, e.g., swimming with him.\*)

\*However, Wang was in Kiangsi, in trifling provincial government posts, in 1958 and 1959. While these posts may have been a screen for a trouble-shooting political security assignment (Mao in a 1959 speech spoke scornfully of the Kiangsi Party School as having been a nest (footnote continued on page 36))

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Yang and Tseng were inserted in the structure again, between the secretariat and staff office and the central departments of the party, as the directors of the committee for organs directly subordinate to the central committee; and Tseng once more as director of the State Archives Bureau; and Kung once more as first secretary of the CCP committee for state organs.

(2) The central control commission and its subordinate commissions, with the known function of examining and dealing with violations of discipline by party members, now possibly including the full range of security concerns of the SAD, and possibly concerned as well with the full range of party leaders (although the probability is that a part of both ranges was reserved for the SAD). Under a nominal chief, Liu Lan-tao of the secretariat was the senior deputy secretary, and Wang Tsung-wu (who made the reports in 1957 and 1959) was the effective deputy, this being his full-time job: Liu Hsi-wu, brought in from Kirin, was another full-time deputy.

(3) The Social Affairs Department and/or the Political Security Bureau or Department, with the known previous function of investigating the loyalty and reliability of party members, a department which since the early 1950s had probably been increasingly restricted to loyalty cases at the top level of party leaders. Teng Hsiao-ping was probably acting as director of this party department officially or de facto as of 1959, although

(footnote continued from page 35)  
of his revisionist opponents), or may simply have been another instance of rotation, it is also possible that Wang in this period was in disfavor and exile. If so, Wang would be running the same course as Kang Sheng--to be favored by Mao, but sent into exile by Liu and Teng, only to return triumphantly to play an important role later in purging his oppressors. Wang was to return, in an important job, in 1960.

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either Liu Lan-tao or Lo Jui-ching may conceivably have been heading it up. (The chances are, as sometimes reported in the period, that Lo was deputy director or at least the director of a section of the SAD or PSD as of 1959.) Others pretty firmly identified in key posts in the SAD and/or PSD were Hsu Tzu-jung, the senior deputy minister of public security, and Yang Chi-ching and Wang Chin-hsiang, the next-ranking deputies; Tan Cheng-wen (probably struck down by illness sometime in this period), Chou Hsing, and Li Shih-ying, all three deputy procurators-general; and Feng Chi-ping, concurrently SAD and public security chief for the city of Peking.

(4) The Ministry of Public Security, responsive directly to the secretariat through its party committee, responsive also (and mainly) to the SAD and/or PSD, and responsive to a much smaller degree to the staff office (or, by 1959, political and legal office) of the State Council which coordinated the work of security-related ministries; with the functions of investigating and arresting party members on orders from the secretariat and SAD and/or PSD, and of investigating and arresting the rest of the populace in national campaigns and (on a smaller scale) as a routine matter. Teng Hsiao-ping's man Hsieh Fu-chih became Minister of Public Security in 1959, with Hsu Tzu-jung and Yang Chi-ching his senior deputies and concurrently high-ranking in the SAD or PSD, and the other deputies named above (Wang Chin-hsiang, Wang Chao, Liang Kuo-pin, and Li Tien-huan), any or all of whom may also have been key figures in the SAD but who were not reliably fixed in such posts in this period. The MPS presumably had an especially close working relationship with the Peking public security department (Feng Chi-ping) and probably with the Peking Garrison (Wu Lieh, a onetime PSF commander) and the SAD/PSB command in Tientsin (Wan Hsiao-tang).

(5) The political research office of the central committee, probably less important than the above-cited parts of the apparatus, but nevertheless with a broad investigative function, amounting at least indirectly to investigations of the men associated with the policies under investigation. Chen Po-ta probably still headed

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this office; Tien Chia-ying was probably his deputy, concurrently deputy director of the staff office of the chairman of the government (by 1959, Liu Shao-chi).

(6) The first staff office of the State Council (or Political & Legal Office by 1959), responsive to the secretariat through its party committee, coordinating aspects of the work of the procuratorate and courts and the ministries with security-related functions (Public Security, Internal Affairs, Supervision, Justice). Hsieh Fu-chih took this over concurrently with the MPS in 1959, with Wu Te-feng as his senior deputy.

(7) The procuratorate and the courts, responsive to the secretariat, the Political and Legal Office, the SAD and/or PSD, and the MPS, with the functions of legalizing whatever the rest of the political security apparatus wanted to do--thus the least important of the organs considered here, as they were neither given nor moved to get significant roles of their own. Chang Ting-cheng remained procurator-general, with the three deputies noted above.

(8) The other central departments of the party with a security and/or intelligence function: the Organization Department and the General Political Department, which (apparently) through their political security bureaus worked with the SAD and/or central PSD in investigations of party members in the party apparatus and the armed forces\*; the United Front Department, which had

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\*Li Chieh-po may have headed the PSB in the Organization Department concurrently with his staff office post. The head of the PSB in the General Political Department until 1959, however, is anybody's guess; neither Lo Jui-ching nor Chin Kung, so far as this writer knows, was reported in this post after 1955, and it seems doubtful that Lo, if he had indeed had it as of 1955, kept it until 1959. That is, it seems doubtful that the head of the PSB in the GPD would have been promoted--as Lo was--to chief-of-staff of the PLA, as it was precisely the task of the PSB of the PLA to prevent the kind of challenge to Mao on the part of PLA leaders which did in fact arise in summer 1959. It seems likely that whoever did head the PSB of the GPD as of summer 1959 was replaced, perhaps by Lo.

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some part of the surveillance and investigative function (non-Communist parties, overseas Chinese); and the Investigation Department (foreign intelligence), under Tsou Ta-peng and others.\* (An offshoot of this department was the International Affairs Research Institute (a current intelligence body) under Chiao Kuan-hua of the ID. (See Annex, Note 14, for those disappearing from the picture in the late 1950s.))

By the end of 1959, the security and intelligence apparatus was complete. This was essentially the form which it was to retain--which, at least, its known components were to retain--until Mao Tse-tung decided to destroy it in the Cultural Revolution.

#### 1960-62: The Apparatus Under Suspicion

Within a year of the Lushan plenum of summer 1959, the case against Mao's policies stated by Peng Te-huai at the plenum had proved to be right. Although the party began in 1960 to take corrective measures, by early 1961 Peng's essential case was being put forward by Chinese intellectuals in the public press, and by late 1961 the opposition had apparently found additional spokesmen in the politburo. While an alleged anti-Mao meeting convened by Peng Chen at that time was surely not known to Mao, in January 1962 Liu Shao-chi himself, Mao's chosen successor and the dominant figure in the party apparatus, is said to have been critical of some of Mao's policies at a party conference. Although this criticism was indirect, there is good evidence that during 1962 Mao began to look at Liu and the party apparatus in a new way.

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\*Political and legal departments--with some responsibility for supervising the work of public security organs, procuratorates and courts--were identified in some provincial party committees, but no such party department was identified at the national level.

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in September he installed Kang Sheng in the secretariat again and greatly strengthened the control commissions.\*

In the summer of 1960, it was apparent that--as a result of the foolish economic policies of the late 1950s, bad weather resulting in two successive poor harvests, and the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technicians--Mao's "leap forward" was wrecked and his regime was facing disaster.\*\* A particularly ominous development was that of large-scale, anti-regime disorders in some of the suffering provinces, in which some elements of the security forces (the militia) took part. The party began at that time a series of retreats from the policies of the late 1950s and undertook several measures to allay popular discontent.

Perhaps the most urgent problem--as of autumn 1960--was the condition of the PLA. Disrupted in 1959 by the purge of Peng Te-huai and several other top-ranking officers, suffering like the rest of the country from economic deprivation and concerned about families at home, as of autumn 1960 its morale was low, its combat effectiveness was questionable, and its political apparatus was in ruins: the director of its political department had been linked with Peng Te-huai, discredited, and

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(\*In the two following sections of this paper, dealing with the years 1960-65, the writer has taken special profit from earlier studies by [ ] SRS and [ ] OCI. Having the advantage of their work as a perspective on these years, the present writer, examining much the same materials later, came to much the same conclusions as to the framework of events in which the fortunes of the political security apparatus (and of the party apparatus as a whole) have to be examined.)

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\*\*Soviet advisers to the security and intelligence apparatus were among those withdrawn; but the apparatus had apparently been so little receptive to them that in this case their withdrawal did not matter.

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shelved, and more than one-third of its companies did not even possess the party committees which were the basic unit of the system.

Mao had always recognized that his own position --and the stability of his regime--depended ultimately upon the PLA, the principal instrument of coercion. Although Mao had stepped back and was letting other party leaders take the responsibility for moderate policies personally painful to him, Mao in autumn 1960 took the lead in restoring the PLA to health. This was done by taking practical measures for the welfare of the troops (increased rations, preferential treatment for service families, reduced work programs), by greatly increasing the time given to military training, and by rebuilding the PLA around a "rectification" program. (Lin Piao himself in October 1960 introduced the "four firsts" which were to make the PLA again a politically reliable instrument: men over weapons, political work over other kinds of work, ideological work over other kinds of political work, and living ideas over ideas in books.) The methods employed for this indoctrination were later to serve for the Cultural Revolution.\* Mao and Lin also supervised the reorganization, expansion and strengthening of the political apparatus: providing party committees for all companies lacking them, emphasizing the principle of leadership by these committees, and enhancing the status of political officers. Although Mao was apparently not yet suspicious of his central party apparatus, those who undertook this work for Mao and Lin in the PLA were persons much more closely associated with Mao and Lin than with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping: principally Lo Jui-ching, the new chief-of-staff of the PLA and secretary general of the MAC (and possibly head of the political security bureau of the General Political Department), and

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Hsiao Hua, the new de facto director of the General Political Department. \* (Lo and Hsiao both proved to be victims of the Cultural Revolution, and the political apparatus which they had built in the PLA prior to the Revolution suffered heavy casualties.)

Another important part of the leadership's response to the troubles of 1960 was the decision--made in autumn 1960 and revealed in January 1961--to re-establish the regional bureaus which had been dissolved in 1954 in the aftermath of the Kao-Jao case. Mao may have been reluctant to do this, because these complexes of political, economic and military authority by their nature presented the threat of renewed "independent kingdoms," but there was clearly a need for better coordination of economic activity--from the center and within the regions--and for better handling of popular discontent. The regional bureaus were actually set up at different times in the next year or so, under party leaders who in every case were closely associated with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Mao was later to recognize this as a serious problem.

The retreats and concessions publicized at the central committee's ninth plenum in January 1961--which

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\*Wang Tung-hsing returned to the center in autumn 1960 in a role in this work. Possibly in his resumed capacity as Deputy Minister of Public Security, he had been investigating the complaints of soldiers, centering on the economic deprivation suffered by themselves and their families. (Some of these complaints blamed Mao personally.) Wang's report, which may have followed an investigation in the field as well as in the Peking area, was cast in the form of a report on the political condition of the "central garrison" or "central security" forces. The report showed some sympathy for the soldiers' grievances but saw corrective action mainly in terms of indoctrination and surveillance. The report was endorsed, and possibly given general circulation, by the General Political Department.

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Mao "presided" over, rather than giving "guidance" as in 1959--came too late to halt the kind of fundamental criticism of Mao's thinking and policies that had been made by the intellectuals in May 1957 and again by Peng Te-huai and others in the summer of 1959. The sharpest such criticism was made by the playwright Wu Han in his play Hai Jui's Dismissal from Office--published in early 1961--which allegorically protested Mao's purge of Peng Te-huai. Even if Mao read the play at the time, however, he was not yet ready to conclude that such works reflected the views of the leaders of the party apparatus.

Beginning in mid-1961, the party undertook another series of retreats and concessions designed to repair the damage done by Mao's policies of the late 1950s. But fundamental criticism by the intellectuals--stated indirectly, but intelligibly to literate Chinese--continued and increased. Of far greater importance, by late 1961 opposition to Mao's policies had again--apparently--found a vehicle in the party politburo--and this time in some of the principal figures of the party apparatus, the very group that had been most closely associated with Mao in the disastrous policies of the late 1950s and (it seemed) in helping Mao to try to conceal his responsibility for those mistakes.\*

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Mao's discovery that opposition again existed at the top of the party apparently came in the next month, in January 1962, at a central committee work conference. Liu Shao-chi, Mao's designated successor since 1945, is said to have "openly" criticized Mao's policies and programs. This 'open' criticism was surely oblique (much more so than Peng Te-huai's had been), and the basis for accepting the contention that it was made at all has to be found in developments external to accounts of the meeting. As portrayed by the Red Guard materials, Mao and Lin Piao emphasized the "very favorable" factors in China's situation while calling for "class struggle" to expose dissidents, while Liu and others (including Teng Hsiao-ping) emphasized unfavorable economic factors. Moreover, Liu and others, far from advocating a purge of dissidents, reportedly criticized the severe "anti-rightist" campaign that had followed the Lushan plenum, urging greater freedom (i.e. the right to dissent) in inner-party discussions and the rehabilitation of some of those who had supported

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or sympathized with Peng Te-huai.\* Liu is said to have made similar speeches in the spring of 1962, indirectly critical of the optimistic view expressed by Mao in January.

There was a precedent for such an attitude on Liu's part: Liu in 1955, just prior to the speed-up in agricultural socialization, had shown a very strong sense of the difficulties (had in fact been the farthest 'right' of any of Mao's lieutenants who had spoken publicly), and had been publicly reversed by Mao. Thus it is credible that at this January 1962 meeting Liu was indirectly critical of the policies that Mao had insisted on. It is also credible that Liu, whose concern all along had been the integrity of his party apparatus, was critical of

\*Liu's tack [redacted] was that Peng had no right to speak, because he had had traitorous relations with the USSR, but that others not so disqualified had a right to make some of Peng's points. The party was officially committed to the concepts of "democratic centralism" and "collective leadership"--which theoretically permitted free discussion until a decision had been reached collectively--and had again been proclaiming its fidelity to these concepts in the months just prior to January 1962. In retrospect, it seems possible that Liu in his 1 July (party anniversary) 1961 speech, taken at the time as part of the effort to conceal Mao's responsibility, was making his points in a way that would be taken by a qualified party audience as criticism of Mao. For example, Liu credited to Mao the call for "meticulous investigation...to discover...inherent laws and not imaginary laws," and attributed to Mao the injunction that policies must not be formulated by a "handful of people in a room." In fact, as known to some party leaders but perhaps not to the party as a whole at that time, it was Mao himself who had constructed fantasies in the guise of laws of development, and Mao and a few others who were responsible for the policies which had led to disaster.

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the 1959-60 "anti-rightism" campaign.\*

Because Mao favored criticism only so long as it was not Mao who was criticized, Liu's attitude caused Mao to begin to think about Liu in a new way. In other words, Mao in his mind probably put Liu on probation--more sharply than in the normal sense in which Mao's lieutenants are always on probation--and resolved to "test" him.

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\*The furious "anti-rightist" campaign of late 1959 and early 1960 had in effect been repudiated in 1960, and in 1960 and 1961 a large number of "rightists" had been cleared and reinstated. (According to Liu Shao-chi in 1962, not nearly enough had had their verdicts reversed; according to the Red Guards later, far too many had.) This rehabilitation effort was conducted by the party committees (including the control commissions, which since have been denounced for their role), and was presumably initiated by the central party apparatus headed by Liu and Teng: whether this reversal of verdicts was approved by Mao at the time is unknown, but (if Red Guard figures can be relied on at all) it is hard to believe that Mao--who had initiated the anti-rightist campaign--would have approved the rate of rehabilitation attributed to some party committees. According to the Red Guards, of the 185 cadres of the Honan party committee who had been tagged as "rightists" in the 1959-60 campaign, the now-disgraced first secretary Liu Chien-hsun reversed the verdict on all but two, and those two were no longer with the committee. Liu is said additionally to have failed to suppress those who--going to the heart of the matter--compared Mao with Stalin in his last years.

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If so, this meant that Mao had to think about the party apparatus in a new way, too. The powers of both Liu and Teng had been increasing steadily since Mao himself had placed them on the "first line" in 1956, and they now controlled the party apparatus which Mao had to use in order to get his policies carried out; perhaps worst of all, Teng controlled the political security apparatus which would normally be relied on to discover other actual or potential opponents. And the party apparatus was staffed throughout by men who were proteges of, or closely associated with, Liu and Teng.

Mao probably, then, regarded himself as faced with the necessity of a "struggle for power"--regardless of whether he had already made an adverse judgment on Liu and Teng or simply recognized that he might do so later. In other words, he saw a need to maneuver to reclaim--or to be in a position to reclaim--the power which he had delegated and had permitted through the years to be augmented.\* This meant at the least that he would have to strengthen his base in the alternative instrument of national power--the PLA--and to make at least some part of the political security apparatus responsive directly and exclusively to himself, either by reshaping some part of the Social Affairs Department (or its Political Security Bureau, or an equivalent) into a personal political security group, or by creating such a group from persons not then in that apparatus. (And if he could not trust the existing apparatus, he would have to create sooner or later another instrument--from, say, the PLA--to carry out arrests and

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\*There are those who regard the Cultural Revolution itself as a "struggle for power." In this writer's view, the term can be more meaningfully applied to the years from 1962 leading up to the Cultural Revolution; when the Revolution began, late in 1965 or (officially) in spring 1966, Mao proved able to purge his opponents at will, and the outcome of the struggle was not in much doubt.

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to prevent any "reversal of verdicts.") Either way, one part of his task was to form a security apparatus responsive only to himself, cutting Teng Hsiao-ping (and Liu) out of the picture. At the same time, he would need a check on that part of the political security system still responsive to Liu and Teng through the secretariat.\*

(Additional evidence that Mao by mid-1962 had indeed begun to think about Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in a new way, and about their party apparatus in a new way, too, is provided in the text--which looks to be authentic--of a speech made by Mao to a group of central party leaders at Peitaiho in August 1962. \*\* Discussing the question of "whether or not the CCP will collapse," Mao expressed bitter resentment of the "revisionist" domestic policies forced on the CCP (on himself in particular) by the collapse)

\*There was of course more to it than this, more than a strengthening of his base in the PLA and the creation of a security apparatus to assess the scope and key points of his opposition. (Other elements of the strategy [redacted] [redacted] were to revive and develop the concept of "class struggle," to explain failures and criticism as the work of "class enemies" against whose "revisionist" influence a massive "socialist education" campaign was necessary, to demonstrate that certain party leaders as "revisionists" would have to go, to begin to pry them loose from their apparatus, and to wait to discredit and purge them until the Chinese economy had recovered sufficiently to be able to afford a disruptive campaign.

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(\*\*It is of interest that Mao himself insisted on adding Kang Sheng (and four others) to the "core group" taking part in this meeting, and that in the course of the meeting Mao assigned to Kang the preparation of a report illustrating one of the theses stated by Mao there. He also singled out Chen Po-ta)

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(of the Leap Forward, policies which he was later to attribute explicitly to Liu and Teng. More ominously, for Liu and Teng at the time, he expressed strong criticism of the way the party apparatus had been conducting its work, with respect both to its leadership of those below and its responsiveness to those above (himself in particular). Mao said that the work of some central "departments" was good (he specified Lin Piao's MAC), but he failed to mention any part of the political security apparatus and he strongly criticized several of the economic organs and the organization department.)

Mao at about this time took at least two organizational steps which seem in retrospect to have been aimed at reclaiming the power he had relinquished. Both were surfaced at the tenth plenum in September. Mao's later assertion that the "second-line front" was abolished at this time was exaggerated, in that Mao did not then depose Liu and Teng; he acted more deviously. He altered the composition of the party secretariat which was in charge of the party's daily work, a step which installed on the secretariat two specialists in political security work; and he reorganized and greatly augmented the party's control commissions charged with supervising the work and behavior of all party members.

The first of these steps returned Kang Sheng to the secretariat and placed Lo Jui-ching on this body for the first time. The two of them seemed meant, at the time, as replacements for the purged Huang Ko-cheng (one chief-of-staff for another) and for the inactive and distrusted Wang Chia-hsiang (regarded as too close to the Russians) in the foreign liaison role, and Lo additionally for the inactive and discredited Tan Cheng of the General Political Department.\* Regardless of whether Kang's role on

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\*A third leader added to the Secretariat at this time-- apparently not as a replacement for anyone--was Lu Ting-i, the director of the Propaganda Department. Lin Piao is reported to have said (much later) that Lu had a role in supervising public security work after this appointment, but there is nothing else to relate Lu to this work, and Lin may have meant merely that Lu as a member of the secretariat was a part of the collective leadership of public security work.

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the secretariat was seen to be that of foreign liaison work (in fact his main public role throughout this period and for a time thereafter) or of political security work again, it seems very likely that Mao was personally responsible for Kang's appointment, as Teng himself would almost certainly not have chosen an old enemy of Liu Shao-chi's and a more recent enemy of himself. And on the assumption that Mao had indeed begun to think about Liu (and Teng) in a new way, the presence on the secretariat of two strong Mao-men and specialists in political security work would be an inhibiting factor in its operations. Moreover, Mao could now count on being informed more promptly and fully about the activities of the secretariat, especially about its political security operations.\*

The second step--the augmentation of the control commissions--could have expressed simply a felt need in the light of the great expansion of the party membership and the re-establishment of the regional bureaus. But, again, in view of the evidence that Mao had begun to think about Liu and Teng in a new way, this step was probably taken also to enhance the importance of those parts of the political security apparatus supervised by party leaders in whom Mao still had confidence (in this case, Peng Chen), to give Mao better intelligence on actual and potential opposition in the party apparatus below the central committee level, and to begin to replace Liu/Teng men by those more responsive to himself (as on the secretariat). The September plenum announced merely the decision to "strengthen the work of the party control commissions at all levels," it did not give names or numbers. Then or shortly thereafter, the membership of the central control

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commission increased from 17 to 60, and, in place of Teng's man Liu Lan-tao (who had been reassigned to the Northwest Bureau in 1960), the post of senior deputy secretary was given to Chang Yun-i, an old guerrilla leader who had no special bonds with Liu and Teng. Wang Tsung-wu, a Liu/Teng man who had apparently been in charge of the commission's daily work, was reappointed a deputy secretary (ranking below Chang and Hsiao Hua), and [redacted] 25X1 began to work against Mao in the central control commission from this time 25X1 (September 1962); but Wang was never identified in the 25X1 post after 1962 and may have become less important in the commission's work. Moreover, Peng Chen [redacted] 25X1 remained the secretariat-level supervisor of the control commissions.

Mao's later remark that he "abolished the second front" at the September 1962 plenum is true with respect to policy, if not entirely true with respect to organization. Mao was clearly the moving force behind the decision to end the period of retreats in domestic policy. And Mao's "thought" was evident in the plenum's communique, reaffirming the importance of "class struggle," asserting its "inevitable" expression in the party itself, and calling clearly for the purge of those representing "various opportunist ideological tendencies in the party" (i.e., all of Mao's opponents). This was to mean, within a few years, the purge of virtually all of the principal figures of the party apparatus.

[redacted] Mao's speech at the plenum, an even more revealing document than the plenum communique. In the context of a discussion of "class struggle," Mao 25X1 called for the education of the young and of middle-level cadres, and for the investigation (and re-education) of "old cadres" i.e., senior comrades. While citing the threat of "revisionism" in the next generation, he went on to make clear that revisionism was a threat now, and called for senior comrades present at the plenum to "admit your mistakes" and be forgiven. Mao referred

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opaquely to the formation of two "special examination committees" to "clear up problems" of unspecified kinds,\* and went on immediately to state that the "class struggle" had to be carried out by "special personnel," i.e., the political security apparatus. He expressly charged the Ministry of Public Security with the work against sabotage, and in this connection said that the party now intended to "kill" saboteurs.\*\* (Late in 1962 much publicity was given to the capture and execution of saboteurs by the MPS and related organs.) Thus, by autumn 1962, Mao was on record as planning a purge--which Liu and Teng are said to have opposed--and as determined to use or create whatever instruments he needed to carry it out.

Other key components of the political security apparatus--in addition to the secretariat and the control commissions--also underwent or may have undergone significant changes in the 1960-62 period. Mao's man Wang Tung-hsing returned to the staff office. (See Annex, Note 15, for a discussion of the staff office in this period.) The Social Affairs Department may finally have been abolished, but, if not, may have been renamed the Security Department and placed under Lo Jui-ching, thus compromising

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\*Investigation" teams were known to be working for some years out of the central control commission and the political "research office." Mao apparently was referring to something else, not yet clear.

\*\*In this context, Mao revealed that he was aware by this time--informed by Madame Mao no later than mid-1962--that the arts were being used to stage the positions of his opponents; he said sarcastically that the "use of novels to carry out anti-party activities is a great invention." He went on to make clear that he regarded this as a critical security matter, as the "overthrow" of a political power was always preceded (he said) by the preparation of "public opinion."

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Teng Hsiao-ping's control of this organ as well. (See Annex, Note 16, for a discussion of the SAD and an additional note on the control commissions which may have been replacing the SAD.) The Ministry of Public Security and other security organs continued to be active. (See Annex, Note 17, for a discussion of the MPS and other organs.) And by late 1962 Mao may have been shaping up a personal investigative body outside the party apparatus, working under Kang Sheng and responsive only to himself.

As of late 1962, the security and intelligence apparatus looked much as it had in 1959, but with a few important differences.

At the top still, as the secretariat-level supervisors, were Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen. However, Teng had probably come under Mao's critical scrutiny by the end of 1962, while Peng was if anything growing stronger. With respect to the most important security organs, Teng may have retained direct control of whatever remained of the Social Affairs Department as a party organ (as distinct from Mao's personal service), but may have lost or have been about to lose direct control to Lo Jui-ching. Teng kept a very close relationship with the central committee staff office and with the Ministry of Public Security (through his man Hsieh Fu-chih) while Peng apparently supervised the work of the control commissions and may have been given the main responsibility for supervising the work of the Ministry of Public Security. Both Teng and Peng spent much of this period, following the CCP's open break with the CPSU, doing battle with the Russians in international Communist meetings.

Kang Sheng and Lo Jui-ching remained key figures, although neither was overtly in the political security field. Kang, who also played a leading role in the Sino-Soviet conflict in this period, by late 1962 may have been working for Mao personally as a watchdog over Liu

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and Teng, and may have begun to build the case against them. Lo, who was very active in his new role as C/S, helped greatly in improving the political health of the PLA, and may (to this end) have covertly headed the political security bureau of the General Political Department (although he was not so reported). Beyond this, as previously noted, Kang may have been heading a personal political security force for Mao, and Lo may have been leading the SAD or PSD.

The other top-level security figures were Yang Shang-kun, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Hsu Tzu-jung. Yang remained head of the central committee staff office and close to Mao (again travelling with him), Liu and Teng. Hsieh was active if unobtrusive as Minister of Public Security and head of the State Council staff office coordinating security work, still working faithfully for Teng and Peng (he had not yet turned on Teng). And Hsu had key posts in several political security organs concurrently--the central committee staff office, the SAD or its equivalent so long as it existed, the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Council staff office headed by Hsieh.

Chen Po-ta remained a special case. He was surely a key figure in the leadership, as he did much of the work in preparing the CCP's doctrinal positions in the Sino-Soviet conflict in this period, he was one of the strong Mao-men given additional responsibilities (he was added

\* [redacted] Kang and Madame Mao were standing resolutely against Liu Shao-chi as far back as 1962. This may refer to the reported circumstances of the publication of Liu's works. Kang is said to have been the head of a group set up to edit these works, and to have recommended in early 1962 against publishing them; nevertheless they were published, in August 1962. The assertion may additionally refer to the reported recommendation of Madame Mao, in or about mid-1962, that Hai Jui's Dismissal be taken off the stage; it is believed that this was done.

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to the State Planning Commission in late 1962), and his Political Research Office did important work for Mao, but this latter office was not exactly--or not clearly--a key part of the party's political security apparatus.

There were several changes in the status of second-level leaders in the security and intelligence apparatus. (See Annex, Note 18, for a discussion of these figures.)

If, as thought probable, Mao had begun to look at Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and the party apparatus in a new way in 1962, and if, as thought possible, Mao put together a personal and secret investigative body in consequence, there is some basis for surmise as to its composition. While there is absolutely no information with respect even to the existence of such a body (it is wholly conjectural), let alone its composition, the previous and subsequent careers of some political security figures permit a conjecture as to who might have been taken into such a group. Kang Sheng would seem the likely leader, reinforced by his new central post in the secretariat: other likely figures, very close to Mao then and since, would be Chen Po-ta and Wang Tung-hsing (who went out of sight again). Another good possibility would be Lo Jui-ching (as of 1962). Other possibilities would include Peng Chen (until 1964), Yang Shang-kun, and Maieh Fu-chih, but all three might have been seen as risky owing to their very close association with Teng Hsiao-ping. Feng Hsuan and Yang Chi-ching had the right background and no such disability, but neither is known to have been particularly close to Mao. A better possibility, as a fifth member of what must have been a very small group (if it existed at all), would seem to be Mao's wife, whose role was growing rapidly in 1962. In any case, whether such a group existed or not, by the end of 1962 Mao's campaign (or "struggle") to reclaim power had probably begun.

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1963-65: The Apparatus Against the Apparatus

In the three-year period between the tenth plenum and the autumn 1965 work conference which fired the opening gun in the Cultural Revolution, Mao was given much additional reason to distrust the party apparatus under Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. At intervals throughout this period, Mao gave indications of this distrust and of his preference for the PLA, took the initiative to return the party to the radical policies and evangelistic atmosphere of the late 1950s, and went much further in constructing a skeleton party apparatus responsive to himself as a check on--and, increasingly, as an alternative to--the existing apparatus. This included the creation of new political security organs and the weakening of the conventional organs. By early 1965, Mao had strongly criticized individual leaders of the party apparatus (notably Liu, possibly Teng) and by mid-1965 he had reportedly made clear his dissatisfaction with some of the key figures (Lo Jui-ching, Peng Chen) he had been using against the party apparatus. By autumn 1965 Mao was ready to begin the purge of the party apparatus and also of the personal apparatus he had been building within it.

In the year following the tenth plenum, the main focus of the "socialist education" campaign which it had launched was in rural areas, where the tendency to "capitalism" was alarming. Mao's first initiative on policy in this period was to draft a ten-point program (May 1963) designed to reestablish collective controls in these areas, and to lead into a rectification campaign for rural cadres held responsible (although it was not yet clear that he held leaders responsible) for revisionist policies. At the same time, at a national conference of artists, he launched a campaign to eliminate "bourgeois influence" from the arts, and he and Lin Piao set off a concurrent campaign to induce the young to model themselves on the good soldier Lei Feng (heroic self-sacrifice, rather than material incentive). In this latter campaign and in the celebration at the same time of the "regulations Governing Political Work in the PLA"

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(first principle of which was to place Mao's thought in command), it was apparent that Mao was increasingly thinking of the PLA as a whole as the model for Chinese society.

In this same period of spring 1963, Liu Shao-chi was out of China and doing himself some damage. Visiting Indonesia in April (with the security specialist and watchdog Lo Ching-chang), Liu and his wife behaved in such an affable and undignified way (probably reported by Lo in living color) as to seem unworthy of the proletariat.\* And visiting Hanoi in May, he failed to line up the North Vietnamese behind Mao in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen appeared to greater advantage (in an easier role) in early summer; in Moscow--accompanied by Kang Sheng as a possible watchdog--for bilateral talks with the Soviet party, both were as harsh and rude as Mao could wish in stating his intransigent positions.

Late in 1963, Mao issued his famous call to "learn from the PLA." In this unmistakable expression of his distrust of the party apparatus, all social, political and economic organizations in China were now to emulate the organizational and operational practices of the PLA. As another observer has said, the PLA was to be emulated because it had made Mao's thought work, whereas the party apparatus had not.\*\*

The first organizational expression of this turn to the PLA became apparent in the early months of 1964, with the introduction into government organs of the PLA's

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\*While Liu was carrying on this way, Mao was calling for an unblinking attention to "class struggle," and warning of the danger of a 'counter-revolutionary restoration."

\*\*Mao is said to have issued at the same time (December 1963) another in a series of instructions on the arts, this time complaining of the lack of promotion of socialist art.

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political officer system. These new political offices, appearing first in economic organs, were designed to replace the existing apparatus of indoctrination and exhortation (agitprop) as the vehicle of Mao's incendiary thought. In other words, they would take to themselves some part of the functions of the existing party committees, and their establishment was a blow to the existing party apparatus, both at the center and in the regions and provinces. Moreover, these offices were increasingly and perhaps preponderantly staffed by retired PLA officers. The new offices were made responsive not to a single department of the central committee (in the way that the PLA's political officer system was responsive to the General Political Department), but to several existing and now reorganized functional departments: that is, the Finance and Trade Department became the Finance and Trade Political Department, and so on. The leadership of these reorganized central departments was not given to party-machine types closely associated with Liu and Teng but to apparently unaligned figures like Yao I-lin and Ku Mu.\* The secretariat-level supervisor and coordinator of the work of these several central political departments may have been Peng Chen, still in Mao's high favor.

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It was probably not intended originally that these political offices would replace the party's control commissions as the party's principal organs concerned with examining the discipline (obedience) of party members; the control commissions seemed in good favor at this time, and were also, it is believed, under the supervision of

\*As if the establishment of these political offices were not in itself a sufficient rebuke to the existing apparatus, Mao in the spring of 1964 is said to have issued a general directive criticizing party cadres for "conceit, complacency, and conservatism."

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Peng Chen. However, the political offices from the start gave Mao a supplementary system, and, as the control commissions came to decline in Mao's favor (which apparently happened before Peng Chen himself declined), an alternative system. Before and after Peng Chen's fall, the political offices were increasingly to be tasked with the investigatory function of the control commissions.

In the summer of 1964 Mao took several additional steps to make clear his displeasure with the state of the party and to create an alternative apparatus. In June he stated to a party meeting his principles to govern the selection of "revolutionary successors," and again he accompanied this attack on the party with an attack on Chinese intellectuals, as if there were an alliance between them (a concept he later made explicit). In July he issued his massive attack on his foreign and domestic enemies, "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," and in August he set off the campaign against the previous director of the Higher Party School. And sometime during that summer (apparently), he tapped Peng Chen to head a special five-man group to survey and rectify the arts, a group acting in the place of the existing secretariat and propaganda department.\*

In the party meeting of June (not publicized at the time), Mao is said to have stated his obsessive concern with the matter of revolutionary successors in the form of "five principles." The principles, stated in the hortatory and vaguely ominous terms that Mao favors, called for understanding Marxism-Leninism (i.e., opposing "revisionism") and for working for the majority (i.e., opposing the "bourgeoisie" everywhere), and also for the work-methods of uniting with the majority, developing a

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"democratic" working style (e.g. listening to opinions, accepting criticism), and making self-criticism. He is said also to have declared that there were "conspirators like Khrushchev" in all departments and provincial committees of the CCP (although not necessarily at the top level). In the same month, he is said to have told a meeting of Chinese artists that Chinese "literary workers" (which would include party cadres) and their publications had in general been unresponsive to the party's policies since 1949, bordered on revisionism now, and might become a counter-revolutionary force.

In mid-July Mao hit hard with the special article, written in part by himself (and, surely, Chen Po-ta), "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism." This set forth a 15-point program to cleanse the party of revisionism. The first of these was an acceleration and intensification of the program of "cultivating revolutionary successors," described as a "matter of life and death" for the party and country. Pointing forward to the Cultural Revolution, this article said that these successors would emerge in "mass struggles, . . . tempered in great storms of revolution." Mao now pointed openly and publicly to a threat from the top level of the existing party apparatus. The article asserted the existence of "degenerates" in "primary organizations" who tried to find "protectors and agents in the higher leading bodies." People's Daily followed in early August with a promise that "greater demands" would be made on party leaders at all levels, and called for a "readjustment" (purge) of "party ranks."

This call was immediately followed by a campaign against Yang Hsien-chien, the onetime head of the Higher Party School, accused of providing the "ideological weapons" for an "antiparty group."\* This campaign provided further

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\*Mao had actually disposed of Yang back in 1961, replacing him with Wang Tsung-wu of the central control commission. Wang had also been replaced before the attack on Yang began but the evidence is inconclusive as to whether he too had been found unsatisfactory or was relieved in order to give more time to the commission's work. In any case, the campaign against Yang and other intellectuals was sustained for months, attributing to them "revisionist" positions later attributed to Liu Shao-chi.

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evidence that Mao saw at least a tacit conspiracy between the intellectuals and party cadres, and there were some indications that the Yang case was going to be used as an instrument for attacking some top-level figures of the party (as the Wu Han case was to be used in the winter of 1965-66); but this was not done, at least not publicly.

The existence of Peng Chen's special five-man group to look into the arts (the exercise preliminary to the launching of the Cultural Revolution) was not revealed at the time, and the date of its formation has still not been revealed, but various materials suggest that it was formed in or about the summer of 1964. It was apparently Mao himself who chose Peng for this role (there are no Red Guard assertions to the contrary), bypassing the secretariat and the propaganda department. Although the worst of the anti-party (anti-Mao) "poisonous weeds" had appeared in publications of Peng's own Peking committee and Peng was to be the first of Mao's "close comrades" to fall, it seems doubtful that Mao was building a trap for Peng so far in advance of the time that such a trap was actually sprung; in other words, it seems probable that Mao at that time had great confidence in him and was trusting him with a special job of the greatest importance.\* This was, of course, a political security mission: to assess accurately the threat from the "revisionist" writers and journalists--whom Mao seriously (and rightly) believed to be providing a public voice for his opposition and thus in effect to be recruiting for it--and from their sponsors. The political security task was underlined with the assignment of Kang Sheng to the group.

the other three as Lu Ting-i (director of the propaganda department), Wu Leng-hsi (a deputy director, and editor of People's Daily), and Hsu Li-chun (another deputy, and an editor of Red Flag); the assignment

\*It was shortly after this (in September) that Peng began for the first time to be described as one of Mao's five "close comrades," an appellation only Mao could bestow. It was probably at this time too that Peng was added (as we now know) to the standing committee of the politburo, giving Mao (he presumably thought) a clear majority even in Mao's absence: Lin, Chou, and Peng as against the suspect Liu and Teng.

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of these three gave heavy representation to the propaganda department that had already failed to do the job.

The party issued in September a revised draft of the 10-point program for rural areas (which had already been revised once, augmented rather than fundamentally changed). \* This September document had quite a different slant, taking the same gloomy view of China's situation that Liu Shao-chi had reportedly taken in 1962, and focussing criticism on the poor performance of basic-level cadres in the countryside. Although Mao was present and active in Peking and could presumably have intervened, the responsibility for this draft--with its unacceptable tone and its excessive concentration on the mistakes of low-level cadres--has been attributed to Liu. The merits of the case cannot be judged, but it does seem likely--from other developments of the time or soon thereafter--that Mao did in fact blame Liu at the time for the failings of the draft.

In the same month (September 1964) An Tzu-wen, director of the Organization department, published in Red Flag a long article on cultivating revolutionary successors, as might have been expected as a part of the campaign launched in the party press in July. An spelled out, now in clearly ominous terms, Mao's "five principles" for judging such successors, and made clear that even senior cadres and party leaders were not exempt from this judgment. He went on to call upon "leading" cadres to "regularly and penetratingly investigate

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\*There is a good detailed discussion of all three drafts in Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966, Baum and Teiwes, California, February 1968.

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[other] cadres and activists," indeed to "repeatedly" do so.\*

It is uncertain whether Mao had decided by this time--September 1964--to replace Liu Shao-chi: not simply to put him on probation in his mind, which he had apparently done in 1962, but to replace and discredit him. However, certain other steps were taken or may have been taken in the latter half of 1964 of a kind which would be expected to follow swiftly on a decision to destroy the leaders primarily responsible for developing the existing party apparatus. These were additional actions compromising or setting aside various components of the political security apparatus.

(\*This was consonant with Mao's reported call, at the September 1962 plenum, for the "investigation" of cadres. But it may have come two years late;) the organization department should have been conducting this investigation--and preparing fitness reports--for the past two years, and it is not clear whether it had made any effort to do so. (Nothing further had been heard of the two "special examination committees" mentioned by Mao in his September 1962 speech, and the campaign of summer 1964 was itself a good indicator that the party apparatus had not responded properly to Mao's September 1962 injunction.) Moreover, An's emphasis in his treatment of "investigation" was on the investigation of low-level cadres by high-level cadres, (whereas Mao in his September 1962 speech and subsequently (if accurately reported) had called for investigation of high-level cadres and party leaders) An's line was consistent with the one attributed to Liu Shao-chi in the revised draft of the "ten points" cited above: that the problem was focussed in the next generation"; whereas for Mao, the problem was now, in the present leadership.

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These actions were confirmed only with respect to the Ministry of Public Security and the central committee staff office. The possible actions related to the control commissions and the Social Affairs Department (or the equivalent).

As for the MPS, Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih earlier in 1964 had added two deputy ministers to the top-level staff he had inherited from Lo Jui-ching;\* he now added another, Yu Sang, who was to play an important role in the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, in this same period some older deputies were relieved or appeared to become inactive. As for Yang Shang-kun's staff office, Tien Chia-ying, the senior deputy in Chen Po-ta's Political Research Office, something close to a personal organ of Mao's, was moved into the staff office as a new deputy director, and there were other changes affecting the hierarchy of deputies in that office.

As for the central control commission, it will be recalled that back in 1962, when Mao compromised Teng Hsiao-ping's secretariat by installing Kang Sheng and Lo Jui-ching in it, he had also greatly augmented the control commission and placed it under the leadership of an outsider not close to Liu and Teng, with the promise of much greater activity on the part of the commission. Then in early 1964 he had introduced a political officer system throughout China which could serve as an alternative to the control commissions, and in mid-1964 he had assigned the reported supervisor of the central control

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\*There is good evidence that Lo continued to be concerned with public security matters as late as 1964, at least with respect to those which involved offenses against the PLA or which might sooner or later entail the assignment of public security forces or regular PLA forces. The campaign against "sabotage" intensified in the second half of 1964, and Lo was probably involved in that.

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commission (Peng Chen) to other work. Now in the second half of 1964 he may have told the commission to stand down, or may at least have discouraged it from performing its tasks aggressively. The secretaries of the commission seem to have been inactive in this role after summer 1964, although one of them was to turn up in what could have been such a role in early 1965. It may have been at this time that Liu Shao-chi said [redacted] that Mao was no longer interested in supervisory work--in other words, was not interested in having it performed by the existing apparatus.\* The remark is undated and may have been made at any time prior to September 1965, by which time Mao's distrust of the existing apparatus was widely known in the party (and was confided even to non-party people,) but it may have been made as early as autumn 1964.

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In the same period (the latter half of 1964), there may have been a change in the status of whatever remained of the Social Affairs Department or Political Security Department. If this department was under the control of Teng Hsiao-ping or some other party leader likewise close to Liu Shao-chi, then, assuming a decision by Mao in the latter half of 1964 to purge Liu and others of the party apparatus, the political security department as a party organ would probably have been put out of business at the same time; if Mao could not trust the party leaders, he obviously could not trust their security organ. Because the task of this organ (if it still had one at all) was probably that of investigating the most sensitive security cases (party leaders), it could probably be put out of business simply by giving it nothing to do or by ignoring its reports. That is, there had never been any evidence

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\*As previously noted, the control commission system foundered because the controllers (supervisors) themselves were not reliable, and because the position of the regional and provincial first secretaries was so strong.

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that this department had been able to dispose of the cases of party leaders on its own authority, without Mao's approval. (Even if there had been a range of cases which this department had not previously been obliged to bring to Mao's attention before taking action, it seems likely that Mao could simply order Liu and Teng to bring all cases henceforth to his attention and could make the order stick.) On the other hand, if whatever remained of this department was [redacted] under the control of Lo Jui-ching, then still trusted by Mao, it need not have gone out of business until sometime in 1965. The indicators for the latter half of 1964 are mixed: of those known or believed to hold high posts in the SAD or PSD, most of whom had other jobs concurrently, some remained active while others disappeared from the news or were reassigned.

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The promulgation of the "23 points" at a party work conference in January 1965 reflected at least a possible intention on Mao's part to purge Liu Shao-chi and an obvious intention to purge some party leaders, even if no one could be sure who they would be. The January 1965 document, credibly described as having been prepared under Mao's "guidance" (meaning in this case close supervision), presented the "class struggle" in harsh terms and promised action against "those people in positions of authority in the party who take the capitalist road" (Liu Shao-chi was later to be designated as foremost among these), some of them "out in the open" and some

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"concealed," some at lower levels and some at "higher," and among the latter some in the central departments and provincial committees of the party

The "23 points" (not published at the time) pointed directly at Liu in criticizing the mistakes of making a gloomy assessment of the situation in rural areas, of advocating harsh measures against basic-level cadres as a class (instead of individuals), of denigrating Mao's working method of holding "investigation meetings" on the spot, and of substituting his own views for Mao's on the character of the movement--some of which positions Liu had reportedly taken in earlier meetings. These charges are credible--not simply because Liu admitted the truth of them in a later self-criticism, but because Liu admitted to these particular charges while steadfastly refusing to concede his guilt on the very much wider range of offenses which Mao wanted (and still wants) him to admit to. According to Chou En-lai later, Mao expressed his "disappointment" in Liu at that January work conference; it is not clear whether he criticized Liu by name, but the "23 points" clearly amounted to an indictment.

By early 1965, at the latest, both Mao and Lin Piao had apparently come to distrust Lo Jui-ching, whom they had installed as chief-of-staff in 1959 and in the secretariat in 1962, and who may have been heading the SAD or PSD (or equivalent, possibly just Security Department) as late as 1965 and/or the political security bureau of the General Political Department as late as 1965.\*\*

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\*\*This is doubly conjectural: that is, it is uncertain whether Lo headed either of these organs at any time, and, if he did, whether he was still at the head of either as late as 1965. It is of course annoying to the reader to be asked to consider hypotheses so attenuated and contingent, but much of the material related to the political security apparatus is of that character.

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Mao and Lin had apparently found Lo Jui-ching, in his C/s role, to some degree resistant to Mao's (and Lin's) concepts of army-building, with their emphasis on political indoctrination and productive labor at the necessary expense of military training. Although Lo (in later materials) was not charged with "openly" opposing the Mao-Lin line until 1965, his sponsorship of a weapons competition in 1964 had apparently been taken as a challenge to Mao's doctrine on men-over-weapons, and it was said later that he had been "criticized" by Lin by the end of 1964. It seems to have been at this time (early 1965) that Lo began to tell others that Mao "did not trust" him and indeed "wanted to purge" him. It is not clear whether Mao (and Lin) took any action at all against Lo until he was suddenly seized in late 1965. However, if Lo was head of the political security bureau of the GPD as of early 1965, Mao may have replaced him in that sensitive post at that time with Shih Chin-chien (unfortunately Shih was not reported in the post until 1966 and may not have assumed it until Lo fell), and if Lo was head of the SAD or PSD or whatever as of early 1965, he may have been removed from that role at that time by the simple expedient of putting that department out of business. In any case, however, Lo retained critically important powers simply in his role as C/s; he could order troops into 25X1 action.

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It looks as though Peng Chen fell from Mao's favor in or about July of 1965--suddenly transferred from a "close comrade" doing a special job for Mao into one of the principal figures of the opposition.

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By this time (September) the entire political security apparatus was in trouble, and this was known to the supervisors and principal figures of that apparatus. By September [redacted] Liu, Teng, and Lo had all made remarks indicating clearly their recognition that Mao did not trust the work of this apparatus, and this feeling on Mao's part was reported [redacted] at the time.\*\*

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\*\*Lo Jui-ching made a major speech in early September, stating the basic concepts which were to govern Peking's policy in the Vietnam war. It was of course too late for Lo to save himself by playing the role of passionate evangelist of Mao's and Lin Piao's gospel.

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The point of greatest interest is perhaps that there is no good evidence that the supervisors of the party apparatus and the key figures of the security apparatus got together at this time to make a concerted serious effort to prevent Mao from doing what he evidently intended to do--that is, to purge at least several of them. It is at least arguable that, if they had indeed got together at this time--perhaps the latest time that they could have--they would have been successful, could have brought off a coup to depose the old man. In other words, their mistake was not to do what they were later accused of doing. Perhaps some of the credit for preventing a coup belongs to Mao's conjectured personal security group (of which more presently).


As of autumn 1965, all components of the conventional political security apparatus--the one existing since the late 1940s--were in Mao's disfavor, and at least some of them were in a state of agitation. Of the secretaries of the secretariat supervising security work, only Kang Sheng had been judged loyal to Mao. The central committee staff office was apparently being radically reorganized, with Yang Shang-kun about to be reassigned. The Social Affairs Department or Political Security Department, long at the center of the work, was almost certainly out of business by this time, with several of its top officers already marked for purging. The political security bureaus of the party departments--the bureaus which had worked with the SAD or PSD--still existed, but their chiefs had apparently been changed. And the Ministry of Public Security, which had provided most of the physical apparatus for the party's political security organs, was undergoing further reorganization, and several of its leaders also were already marked. (See Annex, Note 19, for notes on the fortunes of these organs in the period 1963-65.)

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## THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS, 1965



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Of the newer components of the political security apparatus, those set up as supplements or alternatives to the conventional apparatus, some were just as deeply in trouble as were the older organs, while others were prospering. The central control commission seemed to be inactive. The political research office, Mao's personal organ, was quiet but definitely active. Peng Chen's five-man group for assessing the "cultural" sector was already discredited. The new political offices were coming on strong, probably under other supervision than Peng Chen's, combatting the existing party apparatus. And Mao's personal political security group was presumably as busy as it could be, collecting data and marking targets. (See Annex, Note 20, for notes on these organs in this period.)

As suggested earlier, it seems virtually certain that as of autumn 1965 Mao had had a special political security group working for him personally for some time (a group apart from the one known such group, Peng's five-man group). There has of course been no direct admission of the existence of such a group, only of activity on Mao's behalf by loyal individuals--e.g., Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, Hsieh Fu-chih. And, as previously noted, it would not have been necessary for such individuals to act as a disciplined body under one of their number, say Kang Sheng; Mao himself could have coordinated the work. The point is that Mao had a de facto political security apparatus of his own in key organs of the party apparatus as a whole and in particular in the political security apparatus, the members of which were acting as watchdogs over their colleagues, reporting their actions and movements, undertaking such other investigations as Mao might want, and reporting their observations and assessments to Mao, directly or through one of their number. Obviously Mao did not need this group to tell him that there was an opposition--this had been apparent to him since 1962--but rather to help him to identify those who had to be purged and those who need not be, to give him warning of any plot against him, and to help him make his arrangements for his protection and for the purge that was soon to come.

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Keyed to the various political security organs (some of which had been closed down or were being closed down), the principal figures of Mao's personal security group probably included several of the following: in the secretariat, Kang Sheng; in the central committee staff office, Wang Tung-hsing (out of sight again after March 1965) and/or Tien Chia-ying; in the political research office, Chen Po-ta; in the SAD or PSD or Security Department if it still existed, Lo Ching-chang, and possibly Yang Chi-ching; in the central control commission, Chang Yun-i or Hsiao Hua; and in the Ministry of Public Security, Wang Tung-hsing and (by this time) Hsieh Fu-chih, and possibly Yang Chi-ching and Yu Sang. And as a free floater, Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. The core of the group probably would have been Kang Sheng, Chen Po-ta, and Wang Tung-hsing.

By late 1965, with the help of this personal security group and the leaders of the PLA, Mao was ready to move. Mao had long restricted the powers of the conventional political security apparatus, and had moved in the previous three years to compromise and weaken this apparatus further. Thus, when he was ready to move, he felt sufficiently secure to leave the long-time supervisors of that apparatus, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, in place for some months. But his first move was in fact against key figures of the political security apparatus itself, beginning with the most immediately dangerous man of all, Lo Jui-ching, who was concurrently or even primarily a key figure in the PLA. While it is not clear whether Mao had decided as early as autumn 1965 that he would have to smash the existing party apparatus (this decision might have been delayed until summer or even autumn 1966) and would have to use the PLA on a large scale to that end, he was at least determined to purge the apparatus and might need the PLA to seize powerful figures and to immobilize their personal assets. Either way, it made sense to begin with the PLA's chief-of-staff. The next paper in this series will take up the story from late November 1965, with the seizure of C/S Lo Jui-ching and of Yang Shang-kun, the multifunction director of the central committee staff office.

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## ANNEX

Note 1:

Lo Jui-ching and other sources date from the Tsunyi conference of January 1935 the principle of party committee leadership of public security work. E.g., Lo in a 1956 speech described as a mistake the pre-1935 practice of central government control of the public security system (meaning, presumably, the Kiangsi Soviet's control of Wang Chin-hsiang's public security apparatus). From Tsunyi on (Lo said), public security organs were "placed under the actual leadership of the central committee of the CCP and its committees at various levels..." (This issue was to arise again.) It is not clear whether the first period of "leftist" errors in security work--specifically, killing too many landlords, admitted by Mao in a 1947 speech--came during the Kiangsi period.

Note 2:

Other important figures in security work in the early 1930s were: Chou Hsing, who had reportedly helped Mao with the Kiangsi purge in 1930 and had then become one of Teng Fa's deputies; Wang Chin-hsiang, director of public security; Lo Jui-ching, Wu Te-feng, Yang Chi-ching, and Tan Cheng-wen, all of whom have been reported as heading subordinate political security bureaus in various military areas or components of the armed forces\*; and

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\*For example, Tan Cheng-wen's official obituary (December 1961) states that prior to the Long March--i.e. in the early 1930s--he engaged in such political security work of the party as that of acting as chief of the political security bureau in the Fukien-Kiangsi military area. The Chinese term is pao-wei chu, which can be and frequently has been translated as "defense" or "protection" bureau as well as "security" bureau. These various translations have perhaps encouraged some observers to believe that two or three separate organizations are involved.

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Note 2 con't:

Chen Keng, Li Shih-ning and Tseng Hsi-sheng, in unknown posts. Ko Ching-shih was apparently assigned to North China, and Li Wei-han left the intelligence field for a time. Yang Shang-kun was a political officer, not yet important in the security apparatus. Others who emerged later in important security posts--and are presumed to have been fairly important earlier--cannot be traced this far back.

Note 3:

Chou En-lai moved up to the Secretariat in 1934 and to the post of deputy director (under Mao) of the Military Committee in 1935, in which posts he is said [ ] to have exercised supervision for some years over the work of all or some part of the security and intelligence apparatus; by 1938, however, he seems to have left this field entirely. Wang Shou-tao in the early 1930s reportedly transferred to the broader work of a political officer in the armed forces, and in 1937 he became chief of the administrative (staff) office of the party's secretary-general (Chang Wen-tien, aka Lo Fu, the head not of the party but of the party's secretariat). Chou Hsing, like Li Ko-nung but at least one level lower, reportedly remained as one of Teng Fa's deputies through 1937 [ ]

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[ ] and became one of Kang Sheng's deputies thereafter. Wang Chin-hsiang also had a high post in the central PSB. Lo Jui-ching, Wu Te-feng, Yang Chi-ching and Tan Cheng-wen all apparently served as the heads of political security bureaus or departments in components of the armed forces through the March, and all apparently remained in security work after Kang Sheng assumed direction of it in late 1937; Lo and Yang may have had training in the USSR in the late 30s, as may Li Shih-ying, who disappeared for some years. Tseng Hsi-sheng was said to be secretary-general of the Friendly Region Work Committee. Other security figures who can be traced to security posts in those years are Pan Han-nien and Tsou Ta-peng, reported respectively as

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Note 3 (con't):

second deputy of the Friendly Committee and secretary-general of the Enemy committee; Kung Yuan and Chen Lung, security specialists reportedly sent to Moscow for study in the late 1930s, and Wu Lieh, reportedly head of the Bodyguards Office of the PSB. Not then in security posts, but highly important later, were Yang Shang-kun, who in the late 1930s succeeded Liu Shao-chi as head of the party's North China Bureau (and was to remain close to Liu for 30 years), and Hsieh Fu-chih, the present (1969) Minister of Public Security who is said to have been a student in an advanced military school in Yen-an in 1936 before beginning his career as a political officer in 1937. Chen Keng and Ko Ching-shih apparently left security work for good in this period, Chen to be a military leader until his death in 1961. Ko to be a party worker (rising to the politburo) until his death in 1965.

Note 4:

Teng Fa, who spent part of the early 40s in Sinkiang, was passed over for the central committee in the 1945 elections even though he had once been reported on the politburo--another indication that he was not high in Mao's favor.

Important figures in the security and intelligence field who spent the early 1940s in the central apparatus with Kang Sheng and his deputy Li Ko-nung were--or were probably--Chou Hsing, Wang Chin-hsiang, and Wu Te-feng, all three in the SAD, and Kung Yuan and Tsou Ta-peng (both probably in the SAD, with an intelligence function). Others who can be traced to the central security apparatus in those years were Feng Hsuan, reported as secretary-general of the SAD, and Wu Te, reportedly transferred from organizational to security work.

Others known to be important figures in the security apparatus spent the early 1940s outside the central apparatus--that is, apparently, as the heads of political security bureaus and departments reported or believed to exist in

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Note 4 (con't):

the party committees or political departments of the armies and in the party committees of various regions. These included Yang Chi-ching, Tan Cheng-wen, Tseng Hsi-sheng, and (probably) Pan Han-nien. Others traced to important security posts outside the central apparatus were Hsu Chien-kuo, Wan Hsiao-tang, and (possibly) Li Tien-huan.

Another who probably had an important post in the central or regional security apparatus in the 1940s was Wang Tung-hsing, who was soon to emerge as the head of Mao's bodyguard and who is now in 1969 one of the three key security figures. But Wang cannot be traced to an earlier date than 1947.

Note 5:

A little was known about the organization of the Ministry of Public Security, because Peking announced some appointments. In addition to Lo as Minister, there was one announced deputy, Yang Chi-ching (concurrently high-ranking in the SAD under Li Ko-nung), who was also the head of the Political Security Bureau in the Ministry. In addition to the Bureau, announced components were the General Office (or Secretariat) and the Personnel Office, both under Hsu Tzu-jung (who had been a political officer); the Economic Security Bureau, under Lei Jung-tien, an unknown; the Security Administration or Public Order Bureau (the civil police function, mainly), under Cho Hsiung, another political officer; the Armed Forces Security Bureau (perhaps concerned with investigations of military personnel), under Tsai Shun-li, then an unknown; and the Border Security Bureau, under Teng Shao-tung, another unknown.\* Regional, provincial, and municipal public

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\*Just as the organization of central public security forces in 1949 came to be criticized later, so the organization of border security forces--that is, the way they were organized--was criticized later.

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Note 5 (con't):

security bodies were reportedly organized on similar lines, but the central PSB seems to have been reproduced at lower levels not as that but as the "investigation" component (pretty consistently reported to be the most sensitive and important).

Less was known about the organization of the Social Affairs Department itself, which may have been in a state of disruption for much of the late 1940s after the unexpected replacement of Kang Sheng by Li Ko-nung. Li himself was identified in 1949 as the "former" head of the SAD and as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Li reportedly put in an occasional appearance at this ministry (in a PLA uniform) but he very probably continued as the director of the SAD; his official biography gives him as the director of a "department" of the central committee throughout this period, which could mean military intelligence but in view of his party rank probably means the SAD

It is not clear why Peking chose to camouflage in this way the director of an admittedly sensitive department but one also admitted to exist.

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The deputy director of the SAD for some part of this period is now known to have been Tan Cheng-wen, who like Tsou Ta-peng returned from the Northeast; Tan's tour in Peking was no more than a year or two, however, as he moved south with Lin Piao in 1949. The second-ranking man after Tan's transfer may have been Yang Chi-ching, known to be second-ranking in the Ministry of Public Security and said to be the head of the central Political Security Bureau of the SAD as well as of the Political Security Bureau of the MPS. The only other known officer of the SAD (beside the director and his deputies) was the secretary-general, Tsou Ta-peng.

The organization of the SAD below that level, in that period, is largely conjectural. The Political Security Bureau itself was probably divided into at least four sections--for party organizations, government, the armed forces, and "other." And there must have been components--central, or dispersed among the sections--for

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Note 5 (con't):

case files, for surveillance and investigation,\* for arrests, and for dispositions of cases. The SAD as a whole would seem also to require--and was sometimes reported to have, under various names--offices for staff work under Secretary-General Tsou Ta-peng (a "confidential Office" under Tsou, responsible only to the Director, was reported), for liaison with other party and government and military organs, for supervision of public security work, for supervision of foreign and military intelligence, for the physical protection of party leaders (unless all of this last function was transferred to the central committee staff office), for training, for communications and other support, and so on. But it is neither necessary nor possible to reconstruct it precisely at this time.

Note 6:

Most of the key figures in the central security and intelligence apparatus in the late 1940s have been accounted for in the main text: Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen as the secretariat-level supervisors; Kang Sheng as director of the SAJ until his exile to Shantung; Li Ko-nung as Kang's successor, in the guise of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Tan Cheng-wen as deputy director of the SAD for a time; Lo Jui-ching (with Li Ko-nung in Executive Headquarters in 1946-47) as Minister of Public Security from 1949;\*\* Yang Chi-ching as Lo's deputy

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Note 6 (con't)

minister and concurrently a key figure in the SAD; Tsou Ta-peng as secretary-general of the SAD and concurrently director of the Information Administration of the GAC; Hsu Tzu-jung as the third-ranking figure of the MPS (probably with a concurrent SAD post); Feng Chi-ping, Lo's deputy in the Peking municipal PSD and concurrently head of a department of the SAD, and Yang Shang-kun and Yang Tung-hsing as key figures of the central committee's staff office. (The onetime director of the Chinese Communist security apparatus, Teng Fa, continued to be billed as a 'labor leader' until his death in a plane crash in April 1946.)

Important figures in the SAD's regional offices included several transferred from earlier posts in the central apparatus, just as several other figures were transferred from outlying areas to the center. In the Northeast, there were: Tan Cheng-wen, possibly head of the SAD's Northeast Bureau until his transfer to Peking; Tsou Ta-peng, the alternative possibility as chief of that bureau until his similar transfer to Peking; Feng Hsuan, former secretary-general of the SAD and with Li Ko-nung at Executive Headquarters, probable chief of the SAD in the Northeast from about 1947; and Wang Chin-hsiang, Wang Shou-tao (who may have left security work for good in this period), Wu Te, and Kung Yuan. In North China: Wu Te-feng (the possible chief), Hsu Chien-kuo, and Wan Hsiao-tang (as well as Li Shih-ying before his transfer to East China). In the Northwest: Chou Hsing, chief

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Note 6 (con't)

of both the SAD and the Public Security Bureau. In Central China: Tseng Hsi-sheng, who like Wang Shou-tao may in this period have left the security field for broader party work. In East China: Li Shih-ying, who first turned up in Shantung under his former leader Kang Sheng and who then was transferred to Shanghai as director of the SAD and of the Public Security Bureau; and Pan Han-nien. And unlocated: Chen Lung and Li Tien-huan.

Note 7:

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(Mao in 1957 (in his "Contradictions" speech) gave a figure for "those liquidated by our security forces" up to 1954--that is, before this 1955 campaign got underway. Mao's figure was ~~7~~800,000. However, as previously noted, Mao leaves himself an out in the phrase "liquidated by our security forces." Those killed directly by security forces may have totalled "only" 700,000, while those killed by the masses--incited by the party committees--may account for the other x million.) There is no doubt that the excesses periodically deplored by party spokesmen derive primarily from this "mass line" and from Mao's other principles, for example his quota system, his apparent feeling that in every group at any time--no matter how large or small the group, no matter how many campaigns have gone on before--there is about five percent that has to be purged.

(Of the 1.3 million people (Peking's figure) who made confessions during the 1955 campaign, some 80,000 (Peking's figure) were convicted of "counter-revolutionary" acts.) Again the campaign was found to have included excesses (again allegedly despite Mao's admonitions), although these were not as extreme as in the 1951 campaign.

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Note 8:

The five known central bureaus of the MPS as of 1949 had expanded to eight (unidentified) by the early 1950s, and in 1952 two more deputy ministers (in addition to Yang Chi-ching) were named: Hsu Tzu-jung and Chen Lung.\* With the government reorganization of fall 1954, Lo Jui-ching was reappointed Minister of Public Security and given five more deputy ministers: in addition to Yang (still senior), Hsu, and Chen, the deputies were Hsu Chien-kuo and Wang Chin-hsiang (both ranked ahead of Chen Lung), and Wang Chao, Chou Hsing, and Wang Tung-hsing. All eight of these deputies (some of them identified tentatively with some of the eight known central bureaus) were well known in security work, and most were reported to have posts in the SAD as well as the MPS. At the same time, the regime assigned one of the new staff offices (S.O. #1) of the State Council to coordinate the work of the various ministries engaged in aspects of security work (the MPS itself, plus Supervision, Justice and Interior), and named Lo to head it. And at the same time, the regional bureaus of the MPS disappeared with the abolition of regional governments.

The Public Security Forces responsible for the physical aspects of maintaining security were shaping up in the early 1950s, with the two main tasks of guarding the borders and maintaining internal order. By mid-1955, that portion of the PSF organized into divisions under the Ministry of National Defense was estimated at about 200,000; \*\*an estimated 500,000 troops previously regarded

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\*The MPS also added, in or about 1951, a Public Security Institute in Peking, presumably the largest public security training center; Lo was its director until 1959.

\*\*The PSB organized into divisions--the 200,000--were apparently not the MPS's "own" troops; they were instead available to the MPS for its work, just as the MPS itself was available to the SAD for its work.

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Note 8 (con't):

as part of the PSF were proclaimed to be People's Armed Police and subordinated to the MPS. (Both components were in fact answerable to a complex of military, civilian, and party organs controlled as a whole by the party., Lo Jui-ching was both commander and political officer of the PSF as of 1955.

Note 9:

The principle of absolute party leadership of security work, said to have been established in 1935, was embodied in the party committee system. Only the party committee (e.g. secretariat) could give the orders, only the party committee of the lower level could receive them and transmit them to the instrument of action. In other words, if action was to be taken through the SAD system against a member of a provincial or county party committee, that committee itself must be the channel, passing the order to its SAD component; or if the action was to be taken through the MPS system, it must pass through the party committee of the public security organ of that level. The rationale was that only the party committees of the various levels would understand the total situation into which the particular order was to fit. (The main example given of the dangers of compromising this principle, was Stalin's purge of the 1930s, in which the security apparatus was answerable only to the dictator at the top., It was not clear, however, whether the party committees had the authority to return the order to upper levels or to alter it before passing it on.\*

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\*There are two important qualifications to this principle. One is that the provincial and lower organs of the MPS, in carrying out their routine work, would presumably not need to have party committee permission to make each of the many arrests necessary in a normal day's (footnote continued on page A-11)

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Note 9 (con't):

According to Hsieh Fu-chih later, the Soviet advisor to the Chinese security apparatus in 1950 advocated a centralized and unified "perpendicular" leadership system. Mao reaffirmed that "defense" (including security) work must "actually" accept the party committee's direct guidance. Lo Jui-ching (after his fall) was charged with having sided with the Soviet advisor, arguing essentially that, while broad guidance by the party was acceptable, security work was becoming so specialized that the party committees could not really direct it. This was especially true, he allegedly held, of investigative work, and he is said to have urged again in 1953 that this work be kept out of the hands of the party committees. Hsieh in the same speech casts Lo as a villain on the other side of the issue: that is, as a part of the closed system of the party committees. Lo is said to have been dictatorial in his ten years as Minister; he was in "sole charge of the party organization's requests" for instructions from, and the party organization's reports to, the central committee (secretariat) and Mao--in other words, he was first secretary of the party committee of the MPS--and he seldom let other officials of the MPS know what was contained in either the instructions down or the reports up. It is not necessary to accept these charges against

(footnote continued from page A-10)

work; it may be, as one such worker said at the time and Lo Jui-ching said later, that permission was necessary only to arrest party members. The other, and more important, is that in the party's security work the principle may not always have been observed: in other words, in very sensitive cases, involving important party members, the investigations and arrests might have been carried out entirely within the SAD system; in such cases, the provincial party committee, say, of which the suspect was a member, would not be informed until the investigation had been completed or the arrest made, in order to prevent the committee from protecting the suspect. But there is no information on this point.

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Note 9 (con't)

Lo at face value in order to conclude that some leaders of political security work did indeed feel that the system was unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome.

The dispute about approach appears to have centered on the importance of the "mass line" as opposed to conventional investigative methods. Mao's principle here was that mobilization of the masses (to be sure, under party committee guidance) was as essential to a security campaign as to any other campaign; that is, if the party were trying to shake out the "reactionaries" and "counter-revolutionaries," it must rely on the common people of the area--who knew one another well--to finger them for the security apparatus. Lo is not charged with having opposed this principle during the first great campaign of 1950-51 (a principle which would seem to have some merit in a campaign directed against the entire population, but would tend to force the production of a "quota"); he is charged, rather, with having argued after this time (in 1953 and again in 1955) that no further national campaign was necessary and that the security apparatus should be used not for "class struggle" but against the relatively few important enemies who were left, emphasizing "secret investigative work" to this end. The Soviet advisor (or advisors) apparently shared this view (which may not in fact have been Lo's, but which was probably held by some leaders in security work), and urged the Chinese to concentrate their energies on developing a modern investigative apparatus on the Soviet model. The Chinese seem to have resisted this advice, and to have accepted very limited Soviet aid in the form of lecturers and technical training.

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Note 10:

Lesser but still important figures of the central security and intelligence apparatus in the early 1950s were: Tsou Ta-peng, who remained the head of the foreign intelligence apparatus as director of the Information Administration and then of its successor Liaison Department; Feng Chi-ping, deputy chief of the Peking public security department and its chief by 1955, still a department chief in the SAD and now (in the early 1950s) reportedly head of the SAD of the CCP's Peking Committee; Wang Tung-hsing, still head of the bodyguards department of the central committee staff office and now also a bureau chief in the MPS and from 1955 a deputy minister of public security; Kung Yuan, reported SAD specialist who during this period was hidden in some second-level government posts; Chen Lung, director of a bureau of the MPS and named deputy minister of public security in 1952; Li Tien-huan, a political officer in Korea in 1951-52 before returning to Peking to become deputy political officer (under Lo) of the PSF; and, just possibly, Chang Ting-cheng, an old guerrilla leader, a military-party figure in East China, who suddenly became of possible importance owing to his assignment in 1954 (for no apparent reason) as procurator-general. 25X1

The key figures of the regional security and intelligence apparatus in the early 1950s were in most cases well-known leaders who had served previously in the central apparatus and then in these or similar regional posts; several were pulled back to Peking in 1954 with the abolition of the regional administrations and given central posts again (four of them as deputy ministers of public security, with continued concurrent SAD posts), while others were reassigned elsewhere. In East China: Kang Sheng in Shantung, until his return to Peking on the wave of the Kao-Jao case in 1954; Hsu Chien-kuo, sent from North China to Shanghai in 1951 to replace Li Shih-ying and Yang Fan, and who remained in Shanghai after being named a deputy minister of public security; Li Shih-ying, transferred from Shanghai back to Shantung to serve under his old associate Kang Sheng, and then brought to Peking (with Kang) as a deputy procurator-general; and Pan Han-nien,

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Note 10 (con't):

in Shanghai until his purge in 1955. In the Northeast: Feng Hsuan briefly, as the probable SAD director there until his assignment in 1950 to Switzerland, where Peking apparently felt there was scope for a top-grade intelligence man; and then Wang Chin-hsiang, the probable SAD director (as well as public security chief and procurator) until his recall in 1954 to be a deputy minister of public security. In the Northwest: possibly Kan Szu-chi (not previously discussed), who was reported as the SAD chief in this period, perhaps on the strength of his post as head of public security there (Kan apparently had not had such posts previously and soon transferred to Korea as a political officer, but may have headed the political security bureau in the General Political Department after becoming deputy director of that key department in 1953\*); or possibly Wang Chao, who emerged in Peking in 1954 as a deputy minister of public security

25X1

North China: Wu Te, until his transfer to Kirin in or about 1955 to clean up that province after the Kao-Jao case; and Wan Hsiao-tang, director of public security and of SAD work in Tientsin. In the Central-South: Wu Te-feng, a leader of the party committee in Wuhan who, although in trouble in 1952 for protecting some officials (including another security specialist) who were purged, remained to help Yang Chiching with the clean-up, until named in 1954 as deputy director (under Lo) of the staff office coordinating the work of security ministries; and Pu Sheng-kuang, probably SAD chief there until purged and replaced by Yang Chiching in 1952. In the Southwest: Chou Hsing, until recalled in 1954 to be named a deputy minister of public security. And in the South: Tan Cheng-wen, the former

\*Chin Kung, formerly an aide to Tsou Ta-peng, was identified in 1953 as chief of the political security department of the GPD, but immediately disappeared. Tsou's other assistant, Wang Shao-chun, disappeared in 1954.

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Note 10 (con't):

deputy director of the central SAD, concurrently SAD director and public security chief in the South until recalled to Peking in 1954 to be deputy procurator-general under Chang Ting-cheng.

Important new names entering the security and intelligence picture in the early 1950s, in addition to those of Chang Ting-cheng and Kan Szu-chi, included: Chiao Kuan-hua, Ko Mao, and Lo Ching-chang, all of whom may have been assistants to Tsou Ta-peng in the foreign intelligence field

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Tien Chia-ying, a party worker from the Southwest who appeared as deputy director of the central committee's political research office (possibly still under Chen Po-ta) in 1955; Li Fu-kun, who appeared as deputy director of the security (bodyguards) department (under Wang Tung-hsing) of the central committee's staff office; and Tseng San, identified as director of the central State Archives (tied in with the central committee's staff office) from 1954.

Note 11:

Retrospectively, in the light of Peking's continuing silence about the SAD, its assignment to the central control commission of a task not radically different (despite the difference in emphasis) from that which had long been taken as the SAD's mission, and the disablement of Li Ko-nung from October 1957, the question arises as to whether the party began in the late 1950s to phase out the SAD in favor of the control commissions at all levels.

With the establishment of the control commissions in 1955, the party had suggested an intention to make them important instruments of security and intelligence work, and this impression was reinforced by the appointments of deputy secretaries in 1956 and by Teng Hsiao-ping's remarks at the time. Teng said that the commissions should

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Note 11 (con't):

not be passive, "dealing with individual cases as they arise," but should work aggressively to "find out how the Party Constitution, Party discipline, Communist ethics and state laws" were being observed by party members, and that party committees at all levels should see that these ancillary commissions were adequately staffed and strongly supported.

Deputy Secretary Wang Tsung-wu's report of March 1958--summarizing work in 1957 and setting targets for 1958--suggested that the control commissions had indeed begun in 1957 to move forward aggressively. As the NCNA summary put it, the control commissions at all levels "launched a determined struggle against bad elements and deeds in the party...and correctly and expeditiously examined and settled a large number of cases implicating party members who violated party discipline."\* However, there were very few references during 1957 to accomplishments by control commissions per se (e.g., deputy secretary Chien Ying of the central body headed an investigation of party officials in Kwangsi which led to the dismissal of three of them, including the first secretary); and there were few references to provincial-level control bodies. Moreover, Lo Jui-ching in his January 1958 speech on the struggle against counter-revolutionaries in the period 1955-57, while asserting that 5,000 of them had been discovered in the CCP itself, did not give the control commissions credit for discovering a single one of them. Lo gave the credit entirely to "five-member groups" set up by party committees everywhere as special instruments for directing the campaign.

\*Violations of "discipline" could include the entire range of misbehavior, from lack of punctuality to disloyalty and treason. But discussions of discipline emphasize obedience. At some point in its development, of course, disobedience becomes disloyalty.

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Note 11 (con't)

Nevertheless, provincial accounts of the time make clear that the control commissions continued to maintain their separate existence. If they participated directly in the work of the five-man special groups, it was presumably by assigning one of their members concurrently to the group, which a provincial account has specified as being composed of the "heads of various administrative and judicial organs." (Other members might have included the directors of the SAD and of the organization and political-legal departments. Cases involving party members were apparently turned over to the control commissions for disposition. For example, Wang Tsung-wu speaks of the "party control organs" (the commissions and perhaps the SAD as well) as relying on the basic-level party organs for carrying out the mass agitation which was central to the campaign (blooming and contending, debate, putting up posters, etc.) and of taking measures to ensure that the "examining and handling of cases by the control organs may be coordinated with the popular campaign"--in other words, the handling of the cases of party members was a related but separate activity. The provincial accounts also imply strongly that the cases of party members--shaken out by mass action--were turned over to the control commissions.\*

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\*Various provincial accounts make clear that the control commissions did not get their cases simply in the course of mass campaigns. The commissions often acted on tips and carried out investigations apart from mass activities, in accordance with the original provision that the commissions were to be informed by any party member having knowledge of violations by other party members. A third scenario was for the control commission to begin with derogatory information on one member of a party committee and then to launch a mass campaign which would shake out several others, as in the famous Liaoning case of 1958. It may be too that the commissions sometimes simply framed a party leader.

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Note 11 (con't):

In view of the dominance of the party first secretaries under whom the control commissions worked--a principle of dominance clamorously defended in commentaries of the time--the question obviously arises: what did the control commissions do when mass action or their own investigations (or both) turned up derogatory information about the first secretary? The answer seems to be provided by the trip of the Chien Ying delegation in 1957: they called in help from a superior level, one capable of taking action against a first secretary.

The control commissions apparently moved forward aggressively again, and enhanced their status, in 1958 and 1959. Wang Tsung-wu in his March 1958 report criticized "rightist conservatism" in the work and said that the work "did not meet the demands of the situation." Wang said that there must be "no sentimentality" toward counter-revolutionaries found in the party and called on control workers to "determinedly and thoroughly clear the party of its rightists, counter-revolutionaries," and other "bad elements," paying special attention to cases of class struggle, subversion of party unity, and sabotage of the imminent Leap Forward. Indeed, Wang called for a "leap forward" in control work itself, a refusal to be "bound by established rules and regulations" (one of the offenses for which Lo Jui-ching was later denounced).

Hsieh Fu-chih later described 1958 as having been a year of an extraordinarily high number of arrests, implying that this was true of party members as well as the populace at large. Although figures for this separate year are not available, this impression is supported by both the national and the provincial press of 1958.

Several provincial-level purges of party leaders --including members of the CCP central committee--were surfaced in the latter half of 1958. The most important of these were in Honan (Pan Fu-sheng et al.), Shantung (Chao Chien-min et al.), and Liaoning (Li Tao et al.). (Other central committee members were involved in Kwangtung.)

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Note 11 (con't):

The Honan case illustrates what the party's investigative work was worth: Pan was purged for exactly the sort of "rightist" activity for which Liu Shao-chi has been denounced during the Cultural Revolution, so that, if the 1958 charges were accurate, Pan is just as guilty now as he was then, but in fact he has been rehabilitated.\* The Liaoning case best illustrates the relationship between mass action and investigative work, as well as the astonishing length to which Peking is willing to go (as in the case more recently of Liu Shao-chi) to create and exploit a "negative example." The provincial committee apparently began its labors from a basis of hard information on a single provincial labor leader, and then convened an enlarged conference--with more than 1,000 participants, lasting 103 days, and attended for a time by Teng Hsiao-ping himself--which agitated the masses and ended by implicating and convicting five provincial party secretaries. (All five may have been under suspicion when the exercise began, but the mass campaign built up the overwhelming case.) Exercises of this kind were the progenitors of mass action against the party apparatus in the Cultural Revolution.

Liu Lan-tao of the central control commission, in an article of September 1959 which could as well have been written by the director of the SAD, foresaw an even larger role for the control commissions (and SAD, if it continued to exist) in the wake of the challenge to Mao at the Lushan plenum that summer. Liu noted that in the past ten years the party had purged "tens of thousands" of counter-revolutionaries, class aliens, bourgeois rightists, violators of laws and discipline, and other bad elements, warned that the enemy sought to plant its agents even in the "core of the leadership," and declared that the "right opportunists" must be "completely smashed."

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Note 11 (con't):

Liu reaffirmed the principles of unified leadership of security organs, of leadership at each level by party committees (instead of vertical command), and of dominance by first secretaries. He went on to make clear that the first task of the political security apparatus was to defend Mao Tse-tung and his policies.\*

Wang Tsung-wu of the central control commission published a similar article late in 1959. Wang too emphasized the importance of domination by the first secretaries of party committees. Within a few years, Mao was to decide that his apparatus was inadequate for dealing with the weaknesses of these first secretaries themselves.

The anti-rightist campaign in the party did in fact intensify after the Lushan plenum. It has since been admitted that "errors" were made in this period too, although not nearly on the scale that Liu Shao-chi (allegedly) wanted people to think. While again figures are not generally available, the scope of the campaign in late 1959 can be surmised from Red Guard assertions that in the single province of Honan some 185 cadres of the provincial party committee were "repudiated and struggled against."

The party continued in the late 1950s to be silent about the SAD. At the time, the last official reference to the central SAD had been in 1949, and the existence of regional or provincial SADs was noted as late as 1958 only by the Tibetan press, and only with reference to

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\*Many party leaders--including Liu and Teng--attacked the "right opportunists" in their National Day speeches and articles, making clear that an intensified "anti-rightist" campaign was ahead.

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Note 11 (con't):

Tibet.\*

it was not unreasonable to assume the continuing operation of an SAD or PSD. That is, even if party leaders meant eventually to replace the SAD with the control commissions, the control commissions were still shaping up, and it would make sense to have the SAD supervise their work and to reassume this role itself if the commissions were to prove unsatisfactory. Beyond this, it was an open question whether Mao did intend to replace the SAD (or its equivalent) completely with the commissions. Mao, Liu and Teng all might well have felt a continuing need (a) for a small SAD to handle the most sensitive security cases (loyalty cases involving national party leaders), and/or (b) a department to coordinate--as the SAD had done--the work of all of the various parts of the security and intelligence apparatus. And beyond this, Mao might have planned sooner or later to reshape portions of the SAD or PSB as an investigating-and-reporting body to work independently of other party organizations and of party committees at all levels, so that both

\*Moreover, it was not clear that this "provincial" SAD had the same security mission as the old SAD.

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Note 11 (con't):

the fact of its investigations and the reported results of them would be known only to Mao and a few others. For whatever combination of reasons, it seems (at least to the present writer) very likely that as of 1959 there continued to be a small political security organ--whether called the SAD, the PSD, or something else--in the central apparatus in addition to the central control commission.

Note 12:

In the late 1950s, it was of course the Ministry of Public Security--of the various components of the political security apparatus--which got most of the publicity, in connection with the virtually continuous campaigns against "counter-revolutionaries" in this period. The campaign (second national campaign) begun in 1955 continued into 1957. Twice in the course of it, in June 1956 and at the 8th Congress in September 1956, Lo Jui-ching reported on its progress. In the first speech, while admitting that the scope of the "struggle" had been for a time too wide, he called for still more energetic efforts and for the elimination of counter-revolutionaries to the "last man." In the second speech, he already claimed "decisive victory," again admitted to some leftist errors (false and premature arrests), but again vowed the elimination of all counter-revolutionaries.\*

Mao in June 1957 proposed a "comprehensive review" of the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and

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\*Lo mentioned in this connection only society and the government, but his failure to specify the party did not mean that the MPS had no role in investigating and arresting party members; on the contrary, other portions of the speech (and independent evidence) made clear that the resources of the MPS could be used to these ends whenever the party chose to do so.

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Note 12 (con't):

Lo in his January 1958 speech seemed to be providing just that. Reviewing the "internal" campaign from June 1955 to October 1957 (that is, against "18 million workers and other personnel" who composed the modernized sector of Chinese society), Lo said that more than 100,000 counter-revolutionaries had been apprehended, including 5,000 in the party itself and 3,000 more in the youth auxiliary, plus 3,600 "spies." They were found through the submission of two million reports--gained primarily from mobilizing the masses--and the assignment of 750,000 cadres to follow them up. Leftist mistakes had been made in 1955, but then rightist mistakes in 1956 which persisted until or even after Mao jacked up the work (apparently in late 1956). In the most interesting category--of personnel of the party, the state, the armed forces, and mass organizations--arrests and convictions had amounted to 30,000, or one percent of the three million such people investigated, if those convicted of lesser offenses and those given "social punishment" were added, the figure would rise to three percent. The party had estimated beforehand. Lo said, that the figure would be five percent; denying that this was Mao's quota system in operation. Lo presented the figure as the limit that was not to be exceeded. Lo spoke further of the principle of party leadership and of the operations of the five-man groups under party committee leadership (both already discussed). Lo added almost as an afterthought that in the parallel movement for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries in "society" (that is, in the overwhelmingly rural, non-modernized sector of China), another 370,000 counter-revolutionaries and other criminals had turned up. Lo concluded that there were no longer "large numbers" of counter-revolutionaries anywhere in China, but that the struggle against those remaining would continue and might become "very severe."

It did indeed become severe again in 1958. In February, a ten-man subcommittee of the central committee was reported to be supervising (presumably, inspecting) public security operations, and the press indicated an

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Note 12 (con't):

intensified campaign after that time.\* At another public security conference lasting most of the summer of 1958, Mao and Teng received the delegates, Lo Jui-c'ing summed up the discussion, and Hsu Tzu-jung (clearly second-ranking in the public security apparatus) reported on the current situation and future tasks. The conclusion was that class struggle still existed and that public security work must be intensified still further. Hsieh Fu-chih in 1967 asserted that Lo in 1958 was personally responsible for this line (conducting his own "leap forward") in opposition to Mao's stated wishes, (but it seems clear from Mao's stated position in 1958 and from his role in the 1958 conference that a policy of "fewer arrests" was not in fact Mao's policy.)

According to Hsieh, this pressure for a maximum number of arrests persisted into and even through 1959, (running parallel with the "anti-rightist" campaign). This, he said, encouraged public security organs to flout the law, to take too much authority into their hands, and to falsify reports (the quota system again), with "serious after-effects." That this was indeed the case is suggested by provincial accounts of the time, although figures are lacking.\*\*

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\*There was a supervisory work conference in February and March of 1958, at which Peng Chen presided. It appears that Teng Hsiao-ping assigned to Peng, or allowed Peng to keep, the role of supervising the work of the governmental portions of the political security apparatus, i.e. the Ministry of Public Security, the procuratorate (Peng gave "instructions" to a conference on procuratorial work later in 1958), the courts, and the staff office coordinating the work of security-related ministries and the ministries themselves, such as the Ministry of Supervision.

\*\*At another public security conference in June 1959, Lo concluded (prematurely) that "remnant" counter-revolutionaries had been "basically eliminated."

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Note 12 (cont.)

The Ministry of Public Security was reorganized in September 1959. Lo Jui-ching was replaced as minister by Teng Hsiao-ping's protege Hsieh Fu-chih. Hsu Tzu-jung was confirmed as senior deputy minister; Yang Chi-ching, Wang Chin-hsiang, Wang Chao, and Liang Kuo-ping (named in 1958) were reappointed as deputies, and Li Tien-huan of the PSF was added. Another deputy, Chen Lung, had died in 1958. Hsu Chien-kuo and Wang Tung-hsing had both been relieved for other assignments (Hsu to Rumania, Wang to Kiangsi) in spring 1959, and Chang Chih-hsing dropped out of sight. The work of the eight or more central bureaus of the MPS and of their subordinate bodies was clarified to some degree at about this time: the first three were now reportedly concerned with investigation --or, more broadly, surveillance, investigation, and arrest--the first concerned with party, government, and armed forces personnel, the second with the general public, and the third with economic offenses by both types. Subordinate bodies of the MPS at provincial and municipal levels had by this time turned up with Political Departments, which apparently played this same role as political officers in the PLA--transmitting ideological guidance from the party center, and reporting up on ideological states:

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Note 13

The status of the central committee's staff office --obviously still an important part of the security and intelligence apparatus--was illuminated a bit more in the late 1950s. Yang Shang-kun in his other hat, as head of the party committee for party organs directly subordinate to the central committee, coordinated the "rectification" campaign in these organs in 1957, at which time it was said that 10,000 young people (alone) worked in these organs, presumably indicating at least 20,000 young and old; Yang may have given up this hat to Tseng Shan in late 1957, when there were new "elections." In April 1958,

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Note 13 (con't):

the staff office and the State Archives Bureau had a conference on archives work for party and state organs; it was revealed that such archives were used among other things for preparing cases against "anti-party groups." And Yang was one of the principals at the May 1958 conference which formulated the role of the foreign intelligence apparatus -either because of the scope of his work in or supervisory role over the security and intelligence apparatus was wide, or because he kept the post of first secretary of the committee for organs directly under the central committee.

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Note 14:

Going out of the political security picture in the late 1950s were Kang Sheng (reassigned), Li Ko-nung (disabled), Chen Lung (dead), Kan Szu-chi (ill), Tan Chengwen (ill), Wu Te (reassigned), Hsu Chien-kuo (reassigned), and Chang Chih-hsing (disappeared). Lo Jui-ching too had

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Note 14 (con't):

been removed from the visible political security apparatus to be chief-of-staff, but this removal was to a degree deceptive--in that the selection of a security specialist as C/S almost certainly presaged an increased emphasis on political security work in the PLA, under Lo's direction. (As suggested earlier, it may have been intended to return Lo to the post concurrently as chief of the Political Security Bureau of the General Political Department.) And there is in fact some evidence that he remained an important figure in political security work even outside the PLA structure.

Lo

maintained "control" of public security work after 1959 and to have returned to political security work in the party apparatus at some time after 1959. Lin Piao himself is quoted to the effect that Lo (with Peng Chen) had "control" of public security work for 17 years, apparently meaning the years 1949-1966, although other sources (including Chou En-lai and Hsieh Fu-chih) suggest that Lo's control after 1959 was indirect, exerted through "confederates" (previous proteges) who were not removed by Hsieh.

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Note 15:

The staff office of the central committee under Yang Shang-kun is known to have retained its roles as custodian of the central committee's documents,\* as the

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Note 15 (con't):

recorder of party meetings, and as the provider of physical protection for party leaders; Li Tien-huan may in this period have replaced Wang Tung-hsing as the chief of the latter department, with Wang moving up. 25X1

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Note 16 (con't):

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it is impossible to reach a firm judgment as to whether the Social Affairs Department (or Political Security Department) continued to exist as a party department (of the range surmised above) after 1961 --that is, as an integral part of the central committee apparatus and of party committees at lower levels. If it did, this may have been the party "Security Department" which Lo Jui-ching is said to have headed (concurrently with his C/S post) at some time in the early 1960s (just as Li Ko-nung had once been a deputy C/S and head of the SAD). Regardless of whether the SAD or PSB continued to exist as a party department, there seems a good chance that by late 1962 Mao was shaping up a personal investigative group outside the party apparatus, working under Kang Sheng, taking orders only from Mao and reporting only to Mao. Thus it is possible that, soon after Kang and Lo were put in the central secretariat in September 1962, Mao was ready to begin his effort to regain all of his former power with the help of his man Lo Jui-ching at the head of the party police and his man Kang Sheng at the head of his personal police.

Little was said about the control commissions in the years 1960-62, until the time of their reorganization and augmentation in September 1962. A provincial first secretary and central committee member (Shu Tung of Shantung) was replaced in 1960, and three more were replaced in 1961: Wu Chih-pu (central committee) of Honan, Chang Chung-liang (also) of Kansu, and Kao Feng of Tsinghai. All of these had presided over blighted provinces, in some of which there had been disorders, and the removal of all four may have followed investigations by the central control commission, although Peking did not say so. However, the commission was involved in the purge in Szechuan in or about 1961, and that it was investigating central committee members in the central apparatus (by definition,

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Note 16 (con't):

sensitive cases) during 1962.\* This is consistent with the view--although not providing strong support for it --that by the end of 1962 the SAD had gone out of business

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Note 16 (con't):

(as a party organization and that its party work was now being handled by the control commissions; it is also, however, consistent with the view that there remained a small range of sensitive cases beyond the range of the control commissions and reserved for the SAD or PSD (along with those sensitive cases being investigated privately by a possible security group answerable only to Mao).)

Note 17:

The Ministry of Public Security continued to play the main visible role in security work, but its work in the years 1960-62 (until autumn 1962), under the new Minister Hsieh Fu-chih, seemed less intensive than in the 1950s. In other words, arrests of "counter-revolutionaries" and other criminals were carried on in a routine way, without great campaigns. (The MPS did not play a central role in the "anti-rightist" campaign of 1959-60.) Public security organs continued Lo's policy of an annual "love the people" movement (long practiced by the PLA), in which public security workers for a month did kindnesses for the people in the belief that this would enhance their cooperation. The MAC in its autumn 1960 conference, following the participation of militiamen in anti-regime disorders in some provinces, virtually disbanded the militia as an auxiliary to the public security forces, but during 1961 and 1962 began to reconstitute it, using active and demobilized soldiers as its core. The leadership of the MPS apparently remained stable in this period, an impression reinforced by Red Guard assertions that Hsieh tried to work with the apparatus (all down the line) that Lo had left behind. As previously noted, Mao in his September 1962 speech forecast a period of more intensive effort by the MP~~A~~<sub>S</sub>.

As for other political security organs:

(a) The political research office of the central committee was unreported in the period 1960-62, but an apparently authentic document of later years indicates

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Note 17 (con't):

that it continued to be active as a separate channel for the investigation of the way in which policies were working out, perhaps set in motion whenever Mao had a policy change already in mind. The document reveals that Chen Po-ta, the chief of this office, headed an investigation team of the PRO which came to an ironworks in North China in mid-1961; Chen held meetings, circulated among the workers, lectured on the principle of "politics taking command," and made some practical proposals (e.g. cutting the work force). As previously noted, an investigation of this kind would at least contribute to an evaluation of the men on the spot, and the results of these investigations may also have been filed in the central committee staff office. (This office could also have been a cover for Chen's work on Mao's personal political security group, if he formed one.)

(b) Both the General Political Department and the Organization Department apparently retained their Political Security Bureaus, which (it is believed) had worked in the past with the PSB of the SAD and which worked now with both the SAD (or PSD) and the control commissions or with the latter only.

(c) The Political and Legal Office of the State Council, coordinating the work of security-related government organs, was abolished in this period, but soon emerged as the office of Internal Affairs, with Hsieh again at its head.

((d) The Investigation Department (foreign intelligence, not internal political security) continued to be active, probably still under Tsou Ta-peng, who was identified just after this period as the leader (or a leader) of a central department of the party. Kung Yuan and Lo Ching-chang may have joined this Department only in this period,\* rather than in the earlier period surmised.)

<sup>ms</sup>  
(\*Kung Yuan's membership on the central committee may present an obstacle, as it is not normally CCP practice to subordinate a member of the central committee to a non-member. In other words, it might be felt that Kung, if an officer of the ID at all, would have to be Tsou's superior. There are, however, a few known instances of such subordination, and this may have been another. Alternatively, Kung may have replaced Tsou temporarily)

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Note 18:

The second-level leaders in the security and intelligence field in the early 1960s (not necessarily in order of importance) appeared to be Wang Tung hsing, Tseng San, Li Chieh-po, Kung Tzu-jung, Li Tien-huan, Chang Yun-i, Wang Tsung-wu, Hsiao Hua, Liu Hsi-wu, Chien Ying, Yang Chi-ching, Wang Chin-hsiang, Feng Chi-ping, Feng Hsuan, Tsou Ta-peng and Wu Lieh.

Wang Tung-hsing appeared to be the most important of this group. Returning from Kiangsi (and possible exile) in 1960, he may or may not have resumed as head of the bodyguards department of the staff office (see Li Tien-huan below), but he had some high post in this office, possibly rising to deputy director in this period; and he may have had another concurrently in the political security apparatus in the PLA (possibly head of the political security bureau of the GPD), as witness his report of early 1961; he was also reappointed a deputy minister of public security in 1960. Others important mainly owing to their staff office posts were Tseng San, Li Chieh-po, and Kung Tzu-jung, all of them deputy directors of this office. Tseng was additionally head of the State Archives Bureau and an officer of the Committee for Party Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee; Li was being given a larger role as a spokesman for the party at home and abroad; and Kung remained head of the Committee for State Organs, was added to the central control commission, and played a key role in the party's recruiting of young people. Li Tien-huan perhaps belongs with this group centered on the staff office, in view of his reported but unconfirmed appointment as head of its bodyguards department (Wang Tung-hsing's onetime post).

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Note 18 (con't):

Chang Yun-i, Wang Tsung-wu, Hsiao Hua, Liu Hsi-wu, and Chien Ying were important mainly owing to their roles as the five deputy secretaries of the central control commission. Aside from Peng Chen as the supervisor of this commission, there seemed to be no really strong figure on the commission, but the overall work of the commission seemed very important, and these were its five active officers. Chang was the senior deputy and principal active officer; Wang, although displaced by Chang as the principal figure of the commission, continued to play a role of sufficient importance to make him the main object (among commission officers) of later Red Guard attacks, and he became concurrently the director of the Higher Party School in 1961; Hsiao was concurrently de facto chief of the General Political Department (although political security work was centered in its political security bureau which he apparently did not head); Liu apparently had a concurrent SAD post; and Chien (a woman) had been used for trouble-shooting in the provinces in the past and was perhaps to play that role again.

Yang Chi-ching, Wang Chin-hsiang, Feng Chi-ping, and Feng Hsuan were all important as high-ranking officers of the SAD or its equivalent (for as long as it lasted anyhow), in most cases with other key posts concurrently. Yang, concurrently a deputy minister of public security, did not regain the ground lost to Hsu Tzu-jung in both the SAD and the ministry, but apparently remained number three in both; Wang, similarly, remained a deputy minister of public security and apparently number four in both the SAD and the ministry; Feng Chi-ping remained head of the SAD and public security in the Peking municipality; and Feng Hsuan returned to the SAD from his diplomatic post.

(Tsou Ta-peng remained important as the probable head of the Investigation (foreign intelligence) Department, although he may have been replaced for a time by Kung Yuan or had his position compromised by the permanent assignment of Kung to the ID; both apparently had concurrent SAD posts.) Wu Lieh remained important as the commander of the Peking Garrison and possibly as a deputy commander of the public security forces (although not then identified as such).

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Note 18 (con't):

Regarded as third-level figures in the security and intelligence field were: (Kung Yuan and Lo Ching-chang, probably with Tsou in the ID (and SAD); Liu Shao-wen, possibly the head of the Military Intelligence Department by this time; Shih Chih-chien, who became head of the political security bureau of the General Political Department sometime before 1966 and may have headed it--or have been at least an officer of it--by late 1962; Tien Chia-ying, still deputy director of the central committee's Political Research Office; and Wan Hsiao-tang, still the SAD/PSB chief in Tientsin, as well as first secretary of the CCP committee there.

Two of the big names who had gone out of the political security picture in the late 1950s as a result of illness were removed entirely by death in the early 1960s, and others went out of the picture for other reasons, mainly reassignment to party committee posts outside Peking. Tan Cheng-wen, onetime deputy director of the SAD, died in December 1961 "after a long illness"; and Li Ko-nung, onetime director of the SAD, died of another stroke in February 1962 without ever having been able to work again

after his first stroke in October 1957. As for others: Tan Cheng was removed from the secretariat, in disgrace, in September 1962; Kan Szu-chi remained seriously ill and inactive; Liu Lan-tao was transferred to the Northwest Bureau in late 1960; Chou Hsing was transferred to Yunnan in or about 1961; Li Shih-ying was transferred to Kiangsu by 1961; Wang Chao was transferred to Tsinghai in 1961; Wu Te-feng was transferred to the supreme court; and Wang Chin-shen disappeared. 25X1

Note 19:

As of autumn 1965 the secretariat supervising security work remained under the direction of Teng Hsiao-ping (clearly under suspicion, perhaps already marked for purging) and Peng Chen (marked for purging), and it included Kang Sheng (in high favor, and almost certainly acting for Mao personally), Lu Ting-yi (under suspicion, at least), Lo Jui-ching (marked for purging) and Yang

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Note 19 (con't):

Shang-kun (very probably under suspicion by this time). The secretariat was still directing the work of the political security apparatus, but Mao was no longer interested in using this party apparatus and had already compromised and weakened it.

The central committee's staff office -still the main repository of the records that would be used in investigating and purging party leaders--remained under Yang Shang-kun but was pretty clearly in process of re-organization from both the outside and the inside, with Yang himself on the way out.

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Other curious developments relating to the staff office, pointing to a continuing agitation but giving no clear picture, were: the assignment of Chen Po-ta's man Tien Chia-ying (later purged) to this office; the rise of Kung Tzu-jung (soon to be purged, with Yang) over both Tseng San and Li Chieh-po, who had previously ranked him, to the post of senior deputy; the disappearance of Li Chieh-po in 1964 and of Tseng San in 1965 (neither has reappeared); and the lack of identification of either Wang Tung-hsing or Li Tien-huan (both of whom were to prosper in the Cultural Revolution) in their previously known or reported posts in this staff office. One possible picture is that of the early purge of Li Chieh-po and Tseng (given to Mao by Yang and others as sacrificial lambs), the installation of a Mao-man then in favor as a watchdog in this office to work with Mao's personal security group, and finally the purge of all of the remaining leaders of this office; but there are various scenarios that fit the few facts.

As previously noted, the Social Affairs Department or Political Security Department (or simply Security Department)--if it still existed at all--may have been put out of business in the latter half of 1964 or in early 1965. It was almost certainly out of business by autumn 1965, regardless of whether Teng Hsiao-ping or

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Note 19 (con't):

Lo Jui-ching had been heading it, because both of them were now under strong suspicion or marked for purging. It was open to Mao to use or try to use it as a party organ against his opposition, but he was surely past the time for relying mainly on party organs for this, and it seems likely that if this department still existed in any form it existed only nominally, under constant surveillance by those of its own officers taken by Mao for his personal security force, and given nothing to do.\* Aside from Lo Jui-ching as the possible director of this department before it was abolished or left to wither from lack of nourishment, certain other leading figures of the departments remained in other key posts outside it: Hsu Tzu-jung (later purged), in the staff office and the MPS; Yang Chi-ching, in the MPS and quite possibly in Mao's personal force (he was out of sight, possibly with Mao, in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, and may have played a key role in seizing sensitive leaders like Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun); and Tsou Ta-peng, Kung Yuan, and Lo Ching-chang (all of whom survived at least the first stage of the Cultural Revolution, and at least one of whom, Lo Ching-chang, was probably working for Mao personally),

Others who had been leading figures in the SAD or PSD, however, were reassigned and/or disappeared: Wang Chin-hsiang disappeared in September 1965; Feng Chi-ping was transferred to Shensi in early 1965, possibly

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Note 19 (con't):

to help out after the death of first secretary (Chang Te-sheng), but then disappeared; Feng Hsuan disappeared at the end of 1964 (reappearing briefly in 1966 before disappearing again); and Liu Hsi-wu disappeared in 1964. Of this group, Wang, Feng Chi-ping, and Liu are known to have been purged either before the Cultural Revolution began or early in its course, whereas Feng Hsuan has remained unreported.

The political security bureaus of the Organization Department and the General Political Department, which are believed to have worked with the SAD or PSD for the duration of the life of that organ and with the control commissions--concurrently or after demise of the SAD/PSD--for the duration of their life, were reported to exist through 1965 and into 1966, working with whatever remained of the primary security apparatus. Li Chieh-po's background makes him the principal suspect (he was not reported) as the head of the PSB in the Organization Department in this period, but, as noted above, he disappeared in 1964, and the head of this department (An Tzu-wen) was himself soon to be a victim of the purge. Shih Chin-chien was later reported to have headed the PSB of the General Political Department before his own purge in 1966 or early 1967, and may have taken up this post in the early 1960s; he may not have got it, however, until sometime after Lo Jui-ching's fall from favor in early 1965.

As noted previously, important changes were made in the Ministry of Public Security in this period of 1962-65, as Hsieh Fu-chih reorganized the apparatus he had got from Lo Jui-ching. Yen Yu-min, Ling Yun, Liu Fu-chih, and Yu Sang were all added as deputy ministers in this period. Yang Chi-ching, Wang Chin-hsiang, and Wang Tung-hsing all remained throughout this period as deputy ministers, but in different circumstances: Wang Tung-hsing surely, and Yang Chi-ching possibly, were acting as Mao's watchdogs in this Ministry by summer 1965 if not

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Note 19 (con't):

earlier,\* while Wang Chin-hsiang and Li Tien-huan disappeared (Wang to be purged with or soon after Lo Jui-ching, and Li to reappear in favor in a sensitive post, possibly an indication that he too was working with Mao's personal security force). The Ministry may have lost at some time in this period whatever degree of control it had over the public security forces (despite Hsieh's continuing identification as commander and political officer of the PSF), as Lo is said to have taken them over in his C/S role and there is in fact some independent evidence that all such forces were subordinated to the PLA command (as of 1964; but the Ministry may have got them back after Lo's fall.\*\*

Note 20:

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\*This is inferential, but seems a sure thing. As soon as Lo came under suspicion, Mao would have found or installed his own man in this Ministry to observe Lo and others; Wang Tung-hsing emerged in 1966 in the highest favor, and therefore must have been working for Mao there. The same argument may apply to Yang Chi-ching and Yu Sang.

\*\*Red Guard charges go even further--that Lo not only took over the PSF but put some regular PLA forces in the PSF chain-of-command. Lo was also industriously rebuilding the militia in 1964.

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Note 20 (con't):

The Political Research Office under Chen Po-ta --from which Tien Chia-ying was transferred--was active throughout this period, and was increasing in authority. Chen Po-ta's "investigations" and recommendations on matters of policy were said (by Red Guards later) to have the approval of Mao, and to be almost (although not quite) as authoritative as if they had come from Mao himself. Others whom Mao trusted may have been added to this office.

Peng Chen's five-man group, charged with the political security task in "cultural" life, was still in existence as of autumn 1965, but Peng and his group had already fallen from favor and Mao was about to set a trap for them. Peng himself may or may not have recognized by this time that he had been marked for purging.

The new political departments and offices were coming on strong as of autumn 1965, "giving prominence to politics" and instilling Mao's thought. There were at least three central departments--the Finance and Trade Political Department, the Industry and Commerce Political Department, and the Agriculture and Forestry Political Department. These existed at the regional and provincial levels as well, and other such departments identified at those levels indicated what Peking had in mind as other central departments: a Rural Work Political Department, a Cultural and Education Political Department, and a Construction Political Department. In rural areas, "political instructors" and "political team leaders" were promised--to be installed experimentally--down to the level of production brigades and teams. (A political office was about to emerge--central only, of course--for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) By this time, Mao must have replaced--or at least have been looking for a replacement for--Peng Chen as the supervisor of these departments, but his successors can only be surmised (e.g., Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao).

the party apparatus throughout China was strongly resisting the work of these political offices, which had of course been set up as an alternative to the party apparatus.

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